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THE LAW OF DOCTORING: A STUDY
OF THE CODIFICATION OF MEDICAL
PROFESSIONALISM
Andrew Fichtert
ABSTRACT
This essay argues that the concept of professionalism as it appears
in health law is undergoing transformation as the applicable common
law doctrines are increasingly being superseded by statutes and regulations. The doctor-patient relationship is being subjected to new
rules of conduct intended to affirm the rights not only of patients but
also of society at large. The bilateral relationship between doctor and
patient has in many respects been transformed into a triadic one in
which the concerns of public, as consumer and payor, are increasingly
taken into account. In many respects this change has been necessary
and inevitable as medicine has become a more commercial enterprise;
but the change has also put traditional notions of professionalism at
risk. Where professionalism is adversely affected by the process of its
codification, it is incumbent upon law and policy makers to be aware
of the fact. To this end, this essay first undertakes to define medical
professionalism as a legal construct, and then formulates an analytic
method with which to determine when professionalism is implicated
and whether it is adequately accommodated by the law. The definition of professionalism the author advances is informed by concepts
established in the literature of sociology, which identifies four core
attributes-functional specificity, trust, disinterestedness and selfregulation. Each of these attributes is examined in turn with reference
to case law selected to identify the value in question and to illustrate
the nature of the change resulting from its codification.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For better or for worse, the body of law that shapes our idea of
professionalism where health care providers are concerned has undergone a process of codification over the past several decades, and that
process has accelerated recently. Much of the relevant doctrine that
was historically left to common law is now located in statute, rule and
regulation. In the process, our concept of medical professionalism is
undergoing transformation. It is not just that the concept is now
located in a different place than it was half a century ago, in the
volumes of state and federal statutes and codes rather than in case
reporters, but rather that the concept is being fundamentally changed
through its codification. Society has deemed it necessary to articulate
the rights and responsibilities of both sides of what has historically
been an intensely personal and self-contained relationship between
doctor and patient, and in so doing society has introduced itself into
the relationship as a third party. Pressure for this change has steadily
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mounted as the cost of health care has escalated, large segments of the
population have chronically lacked adequate access, and quality concerns have persisted. But the potential costs of codification cannot be
ignored. There is a price to pay in exchanging a culture in which professionals regulated their conduct principally with reference to their
ethical canons and personal codes of conduct for one in which doctors
and patients tend to refer to their respective legal rights obligationstrading a culture of responsibility for a culture of rights.' This essay
urges that where law is a catalyst for producing fundamental changes
in professional relationships, someone, whether legislatures or courts,
should be taking a second look.
My thesis is built upon a premise that should be identified at the
outset, namely that there is in fact a legal doctrine defining medical
professionalism. To establish this I will look briefly at agency law,
where the applicable doctrines have traditionally reposed, concluding,
however, that this body of law is not adequate to explain the concept
of professionalism as it is currently evolving. Then, in Section II
below, I propose what may be termed an essentialist approach to
defining professionalism as a legal construct.2 Among other things,
what is needed to understand medical professionalism as it currently
makes its appearance in the law is a construct in which the interests of
more than the doctor and patient alone are addressed. The significant
body of literature on professionalism developed by sociologists is a
valuable resource for this purpose. In Section III below I propose an
analytic method by which we can determine when the core elements
of the concept of medical professionalism are at issue in the law, and
whether courts and policy makers may be justified in calling for a
change in direction. Section IV applies the methodology to case law,
most of which will be familiar to health law scholars as classics. I
conclude, in Section V, that it remains important for the law to
acknowledge the concept of professionalism in health care, and to
understand its transformation, albeit the law may not in the last analy-

1 See generally Wendy K. Mariner, Informed Consent in the Post- Modern
Era, 13 LAW & SoC. INQUIRY 385 (1988). See also Carol A. Heimer, Responsibility in
Health Care: Spanning the Boundary between Law and Medicine, 41 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 465 (2006); Lois Shepherd, Assuming Responsibility, 41 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 445,445 (2006).
2 See Mark A. Hall, The History andFuture of Health Care Law: An Essentialist View, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv 347, 357-58 (2006) (using the term "essentialism" to describe an approach to defining health law generally as a body of substantive
law with coherent features rather than an "assortment of rules that results from applying other bodies of substantive law to a particular economic sector or human activity").
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sis be entirely sufficient to the underlying concept. Professionalism
cannot ultimately be confined to its legal parameters.
A. The Law of Medical Professionalism
The subject of this essay is the law of medical professionalism. I
wish to emphasize from the outset that the subject is the law of medical professionalism, as opposed to medical ethics, and that it is the law
of medical professionalism,as opposed to the variety of laws that may
from time to time affect medical professionals-as tort law notably
does-but without necessarily defining them as such. That is, I
propose to deal with the concept of professionalism as it appears in
the body of American law dealing with the aspect of the conduct of
medical practitioners that distinguishes them from other service
providers. I wish to stress that this perspective on professionalism
differs from that typically encountered in the law school curriculum,
where discussion of professionalism tends to focus on the ethical
canons of professional associations. As a legal doctrine, professionalism has consequence in terms of enforceable rights and responsibilities, authority and duty. It is one thing, for example, for practitioners
collectively to exhort themselves in their canons of professional conduct to keep patients informed; 3 it is another thing for a court of law to
provide a patient with recourse against a physician for a breach of his
or her obligation under the legal doctrine of informed consent. It is
the latter circumstance, and others like it, in which this essay seeks to
locate the law of medical professionalism.
It must be conceded that the body of law to which I refer is not
conspicuous, or at least it has not been so in the past. There is no
Restatement of the Law Governing Medical Professionals. 4 The
jurisprudence of medical professionalism has relatively low visibility
for reasons that have important implications for the subject. One
reason is that the concept of professionalism is already at least
partially accommodated within the larger doctrine of agency law, the
patient being the principal and the physician being the agent in the
3 See, e.g., AM. ACAD. OF NEUROLOGY,

AM. MED. Ass'N, CODE OF

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1.4, at 2 (2008), available at http://www.aan.com
/globals/axon/assets/3968.pdf.
4 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD): THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS at
xvii-xviii (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 1998) (according to Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr.,
Emeritus Director of the American Law Institute, there is unlikely to be a restatement
governing medical professionals). See Carol A. Heimer, Responsibility in Health
Care: Spanning the Boundary between Law and Medicine, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
465, 466 (2006), for a discussion of the regulation of "law-like prescriptive statements" from "quasi-public regulatory bodies."
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case of medical professionalism; but even so, there are other reasons
that tell us more about the nature of medical professionalism.
Historically, the body of law addressing professionalism has had a
low profile because courts and legislatures have given professions
latitude to self-regulate. Self-regulation, as we shall see, is in fact one
of the defining attributes of professionalism. Another closely related
factor is that professional relationships have historically been viewed
as fundamentally different from the commercial relationships for
which the law of contract has developed. The law of contract has
emerged to address transactions between self-interested parties; the
relationship between a physician and his or her patient, by contrast,
has traditionally been seen as a fiduciary one in which the interests of
the physician are aligned with those of the patient in a way that largely obviates the need for marketplace law.5 Thus it has long been elementary in defining professionalism to begin by distinguishing it from
commercial activity:
[T]he dominant keynote of the modem economic system is
almost universally held to be the high degree of free play it
gives to the pursuit of self-interest. It is the "acquisitive society," or the "profit system" as two of the most common formulas run. But by contrast with business in this interpretation
the professions are marked by "disinterestedness." The professional man is not thought of as engaged in the pursuit of
his personal profit, but in performing services to his patients
or clients, or to impersonal values like the advancement of
science. Hence the professions in this context appear to be
atypical.... 6
Whereas in the law of commercial contract courts have historically been ready and willing to apply certain warranties, 7 they have
typically been reluctant to do so in the case of medical professionalism.8 The classic argument against professional warranties, as stated
5 See the discussion of "disinterestedness" in Section H.C.
6 Talcott Parsons, The Professions and Social Structure, in ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 34, 35 (rev. ed. 1954).

7 See Williamson v. Amrani, 152 P.3d 60 (Kan. 2007).
8 See, e.g., Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 186 (Mass. 1973) (evaluating a patient's claim for damages when a surgeon failed to fulfill a promise to provide the patient with a nose similar to Hedy Lamarr's nose). For similar reasons,
courts have declined to apply contract law in a variety of other physician-patient
disputes, even where the parties have expressly agreed that a contract existed. See
Maxwell J. Mehlman, The Patient-Physician Relationship in an Era of Scarce
Resources: Is There a Duty to Treat?, 25 CONN. L. REv. 349, 356-57 [hereinafter Is
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in Sullivan v. 0 'Connor, is that only doctors of substandard integrity9
would promise specific results, given the uncertainties of medicine.
Similarly, whereas the law of agency involves subordination of the
autonomy of the agent to the will of the principal in significant
respects, 10 courts have acknowledged the relationship between doctor
and patient to be materially different. The reliance of patients upon
their physicians is often what Judge Robinson described as "well-nigh
abject" in Canterbury v. Spence, with the result that normal agency
rules of control cannot obtain and must be modified accordingly.I
The duties of our agents to act in accordance with our instructions, to
keep us informed, to respect our privacy and even to act with undivided loyalty have in the past often been modified with respect to our
physicians in a manner that confirms the doctor-patient relationship to
be a special case within the law of agency, if not in some respects an
exception to it.
The legal concept of medical professionalism, that is, has historically been expressed in terms of its divergence from commercial
norms, which in turn has led to a sense that legal norms are not a good
fit. That divergence was greatest by the middle of the last century,
when the courts spoke of the "learned professions," whose members
were exempted from the application of antitrust laws 2 and not yet
There a Duty to Treat?] ("[Clourts have struck down the following types of patientphysician agreements: a patient's release of the physician from liability for negligence, a limitation of the patient to $15,000 in damages, and an acceptance of binding
arbitration by the patient.") (citations omitted); see also Maxwell J. Mehlman, Fiduciary Contracting: Limitations on Bargaining Between Patients and Health Care
Providers, 51 U. Prr. L. REV. 365, 401-04 (1990). See also. Tunkl v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 448 (Cal. 1963) (to this list of unenforceable contracts
we may add that courts have struck down disclaimers of liability and waivers of the
right to sue as a condition to receiving charity care at a teaching hospital).
9 Sullivan, 296 N.E.2d at 185-86.
10 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006).
" Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The court
starts with the professional's established duty to warn, for which the standard in a
majority of jurisdictions before Canterbury was determined with reference to a
prudent physician standard. The court then reasons that because the object of the
physician's disclosure is to permit the patient to exercise choice, and because the
reliance of the patient upon the physician in this undertaking is "well-nigh abject", the
disclosure duty is augmented in the health care context. Id. at 782.
12 With respect to medicine, the conviction that quality of patient care might
suffer seems to have made courts initially reluctant to apply antitrust laws to the
learned professions at all, until the clear language of the Sherman Act could no longer
be denied. Cf. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (overruling the
"learned professions" exception with respect to the legal profession). In re Mich.
State Med. Soc'y, 101 F.T.C. 191, 267 (1983) (holding that boycotts and "feetampering" by independent medical doctors violated the Sherman Act, but declining
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permitted to organize their practices in corporate form. 13 Medical
professionalism then often made its appearance in legal doctrine in the
negative, as a tissue of exceptions to normative commercial rules.
Ironically, it was at that point that the law of medical professionalism
was arguably most coherent. Courts could be relatively confident that
they could identify medical professionalism when they encountered it,
even if only by reference to what it was not. Law and society alike
were comfortable in the conviction that the doctor's office was located
at a safe distance from the marketplace, but in a place nonetheless
easy to find. 14
But the assumptions upon which the concept of professionalism
has traditionally stood have been fundamentally altered in recent
times. For one thing, the law of medical professionalism has increasingly been reduced to statute at both the state and federal levels.
Matters that lawmakers and courts 50 years ago may have left for selfregulation by the medical profession--conflicts of interest, patient
privacy issues, disclosure and consent norms with respect to diagnoses, skill levels and therapeutic objectives, interdisciplinary boundary
disputes and the like-are now codified. 15 At the same time, the
distance between the doctor's office and the marketplace seems to
have narrowed: exceptions to the rules of commercial conduct once

to apply per se analysis). The "learned professions" doctrine was gradually unwound
with respect to the medical profession in a series of cases, including this one; FTC v.
Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 447-48 (1986) (notwithstanding their claim that
quality of care concerns justified their conduct, dentists were held to have violated the
Sherman Act by withholding x-rays in conjunction with demands for higher reimbursement rates from an insurer); Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 671 F. Supp. 1465, 147779 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (modifying rule of reason analysis to allow AMA to justify its
boycott of chiropractors in the name of patient care). See also BARRY R. FURROW ET
AL., HEALTH LAW § 14-6 (2nd ed. 2000). Even after Goldfarb had confirmed that
antitrust laws applied to professions, courts were hesitant to apply per se rather than
"rule of reason" analysis where quality of patient care was alleged to be at risk. See
id. at § 14-9.
13 See generally, Andrew Fichter, Owning a Piece of the Doc: State Law
Restraints on Lay Ownership of Healthcare Enterprises, 39 J. HEALTH L. 1 (2006)
(discussing state law prohibitions on lay ownership of medical practices, historical
restrictions on organization of physician practices in corporate form and related corporate practice of medicine prohibitions).
14 See, e.g., Einer R. Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a CoherentField of
Law?, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 365, 371 (2006) (noting that "the best evidence that
health law can be a coherent field of law is that it used to be one").
15 For a comprehensive survey of statutes, rules and regulations governing
American medical practice, see ROBERT I. FIELD, HEALTH CARE REGULATION IN
AMERICA (Oxford 2006) and Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health Law and Administrative
Law: A MarriageMost Convenient, 49 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1 (2004).
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established for physicians have been eroded, 16 as courts and legislators alike appear more willing to apply the law of commerce to the
medical profession. Witness a recent decision of the Kansas Supreme
Court to apply state consumer protection laws to7 assess the adequacy
of disclosures made by a surgeon to his patient.'
It would be difficult to disentangle cause and effect where this
change is concerned. Has medicine become more commercial in fact,
as a result of which lawmakers have felt obligated to apply the rules
of commerce? Or is the steady commercialization of medicine the
result of what Guido Calabresi has called the "statutorification" of
common law, in this case the law of doctoring. 8 Both dynamics can
be presumed, and it is not ultimately necessary to decide between
them for purposes of this essay. What is important for present
purposes, however, is to acknowledge the process and assess the
effect of the (arguably excessive) reticulation of the concept of medical professionalism in statutes, rules and regulations. One ironic consequence may be that as the concept of medical professionalism is
being articulated, rationalized and memorialized, it is also being
effaced. If self-regulation is a defining attribute, as I shall argue it is,
can professionalism survive legislative codification? If disinterestedness is a core principle, what is the consequence to the doctor-patient
relationship of forcing it into a mold developed for commerce, where
self-interest is assumed to be the prime mover? Now that a growing
body of law exists that purports to regulate the relationship between
medical professionals and patients, we are perhaps in a better position
than ever to ascribe doctrinal definition to this relationship, but at
what cost to the underlying construct? It is arguable that just as medical professionalism is becoming increasingly visible as a legal
construct, its relevance is being diminished.
At the same time, the forces that have led to the increased codification of medical professionalism should be given their due. The felt
need to write laws to shape professional conduct derives from (i) the
sense that medicine has become much more commercial on its own
accord in recent decades, (ii) the rise of the patient rights and patient
autonomy movements, and (iii) the realization by policy makers that
something has to be done to increase public access to affordable
health care, to identify a few notable causes. To the extent that professionalism itself could not respond to these realities, policy makers
16 See

Fichter, supra note 13, at 2-4.

17 Williamson v. Amrani, 152 P.3d 60, 72 (Kan. 2007); see also Elhauge,

supra note 14, at 377-78 (ascribing causes for the disappearance of legal deference to
professional self-regulation).
18 GuiDo CALABRESi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 6-7 (1982).
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have been forced to modify professional conduct accordingly. At this
point in our history, few would deny that some transformation of the
classical doctrine of medical professionalism has been justified.
This essay is written in the conviction that medical professionalism continues to play a critical role in society, notwithstanding its
subjection to both internal and external transformative pressures, and
that its chances of remaining vital improve if legislators and courts
comprehend its nature and function. Specifically, if we recognize the
core attributes of medical professionalism when we encounter them in
legal contexts, acknowledge the respective interests of medical care
providers, patients and society alike in professional relationships, and
appreciate the effects of statutory and decisional law on these relationships, we are in a much better position than otherwise to assure the
survival of medical professionalism. In service of this objective this
essay proposes an analytic methodology that can be applied to identify
professionalism's defining attributes and to assess the effect of both
statutory and decisional law upon them.
B. Physician As Service Provider: The Statutory Context
The Kansas case referenced above brings the themes of this essay
into focus. In Williamson v. Amrani,9 Tracy Williamson brought a
claim against her surgeon, Dr. Amrani, under the Kansas Consumer
Protection Act ("KCPA") 20 alleging that Dr. Amrani had misrepresented his rate of success with certain surgical procedures in question.
Dr. Amrani protested that Williamson's claim improperly circumvented the body of Kansas law that had been developed to handle
medical malpractice. The KCPA had advantages for plaintiffs generally in matters relating to negligence, although many of these were
ultimately determined to be unavailable in Williamson's case. Whereas damages in medical malpractice cases had at least at one period
in Kansas history been capped 2 the KCPA offered successful plaintiffs a choice between actual damages and a statutory penalty. Legislative changes to the collateral source rule favorable to health care
providers would apply in the context of malpractice litigation, but not
in a consumer transaction case.2 2 A plaintiff permitted to bring an
action under the KCPA for conduct involving informed consent or
some other more traditionally professional conduct might also have
19 Williamson v. Amrani, 152 P.3d 60 (Kan. 2007).
Kansas Consumer Protection Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-623 (2005).

20

21
22

Id. § 60-3411 (2005) (repealed 1989).
See, e.g., Williamson v. Amrani, 152 P.3d at 71 ("[T]he KCPA is inappli-

cable to arrangements that fall within the provisions of the KRLTA.").
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significant leverage for settlement if, as the dissent in Williamson
intimates, malpractice insurers were to take the position that they are
not obligated to cover consumer fraud claims. 23 Defending professionals in Dr. Amrani's position might find themselves having to
settle or risk proceeding without defense coverage or under reservation of rights assertions, for different reasons, by both their malpractice and general liability insurers. Williamson, moreover, had hoped
for another material advantage to a KCPA claim: she might have
avoided the necessity of producing expert testimony to establish the
standard by which Dr. Amrani's disclosures were to be measured,
although Williamson ultimately proved unsuccessful in this regard.24
She sought to characterize her transaction with Dr. Amrani as entirely
a commercial transaction, in which case the requisite level of disclosure would have been determined from the perspective of a reasonable
consumer (in this case, a patient), whereas Dr. Amrani argued that the
doctor-patient relationship defined the interaction, and as a result the
question of disclosure should be resolved by testimony from medical
experts. And while the statute of limitations was not an issue in her
case, Williamson could have had three years to bring her claim under
the KCPA, whereas the limit for traditional medical malpractice
claims in Kansas is two years.25
For his part, Dr. Amrani argued that application of the KCPA to a
doctor-patient transaction was improper because Kansas had developed a comprehensive statutory scheme under which doctor-patient
transactions were intended to be exclusively handled. For one thing, a
plaintiff was required to undergo the expense of producing expert
witnesses in order to establish the applicable standard of care in a
professional negligence action, and for another, a two-year statute of
limitations applied. Moreover, the plaintiff would have been limited
as to what information about insurance or other sources of funding
available to the defendant physician could be presented to the jury.
Such measures could be taken as evidence of a legislative policy of
deterring malpractice litigation. By contrast, the policy behind the
KCPA is calculated to favor the service consumer, and perhaps even
to encourage litigation. The rationale for this would be to enable
commerce to self-regulate by facilitating consumer litigation. The
23 Id. at 71-72.
24

The court ultimately determined that while the reasonable patient standard

should apply to the extent that the question was purely Dr. Amrani's history of success with the surgical procedures at issue, the question was also necessarily whether
full disclosure of risks was in the patient's best interest, and to this extent expert
testimony was required. Id. at 72-73.
SKArN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(a) (2005).
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barriers to litigation evident in professional litigation are lowered,
successful consumer litigants are rewarded and unsuccessful service
providers punished with penalty damages.
The KCPA contained no carve-out for cases involving professional negligence. Williamson thus forced the Kansas Supreme Court
to decide between applying the KCPA as written, thereby honoring
the principle of legislative supremacy, or preserving a jurisprudential
scheme that had been specially developed to handle professional
negligence cases. Judge Davis articulated this position in his dissent,
arguing that the majority ruling effectively gutted the body of law
developed in Kansas for the purpose of controlling malpractice litigation. If a patient could bring a claim sounding in malpractice under
consumer protection law, all the measures taken by the legislature on
policy grounds to attract physicians, curb malpractice litigation and
limit damages would be for naught.2 6 Worse, the effect would be to
aggravate the situation, as broad avenues for litigation would be
opened, insurers would be panicked into raising premiums and limiting coverage, and the medical profession would experience a chilling
effect.
The value of Williamson for purposes of this essay is that it forces
us to consider how we can know when professionalism as such may
be at issue so that, if so disposed, a court may consider treating that as
a separate issue. Although it seems evident that a case in which a
party seeks to apply a consumer protection statute to a doctor-patient
relationship raises the issue of professionalism, it is not so clear which
elements of the statute do so, or which aspects of professionalism are
implicated. Some of the provisions of Kansas law developed to deter
malpractice litigation can be said to benefit professionals, but not to
define them as such. That a statute of limitation is shorter by a year in
the case of medical negligence than in consumer suits may reflect a
policy favoring professions, but not one that tells us anything fundamental about professionalism. Another aspect of the Williamson case
does more in this regard, however, and that is the warranty issue that
lies at the heart of the case. Implied warranties enforceable against
commercial service providers are consistent with public policy as they
offset the unfair advantage the provider may otherwise have against
individual consumers. The policy proceeds from the presumption that
consumers are competent to regulate markets where dispute resolution
inequality is reduced. The jurisprudence of medical professionalism,
See Williamson, 152 P.3d at 75 (Davis, J., dissenting) ("Consideration of
the issue must also include an analysis of the legislature's extensive treatment of the
medical and health care professions found throughout Kansas' statutory scheme.").
26
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on the other hand, has traditionally been wary of warranties, and
suspicious of any presumption that patients may be competent to regulate their relationships with medical professionals. 27 Still, the observation that a professional relationship is different from a commercial
one tells us more about what professionalism is not than what it is.
The Williamson court was nevertheless aware that unmitigated
application of the KCPA to the issue at bar could have an adverse
impact on professionalism, or at least on the statutory scheme Kansas
has constructed to deal with professionals. Clearly there is a risk of
damage to the doctor-patient relationship where it is suddenly recast
as a commercial contract between presumptively equal bargainers.
Both doctor and patient are potentially losers. The former must consider the implications of providing services under an implied
warranty, which could precipitate the "race to the bottom" predicted
in the Sullivan case, and the latter must consider exchanging the trust
to which patients have traditionally been entitled for a caveat emptor
stance with respect to their professionals. While it applied the KCPA
as written to Dr. Amrani, the court also drew a map showing the legislature what needed to be changed. The problem arose from the fact
that the KCPA was modeled upon the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act (the "UCSPA"), which defines the crucial phrase "trade or
commerce" broadly enough to include the practice of medicine. The
definition of a "consumer transaction" in the KCPA excluded insurance contracts, but not service arrangements between patients or
clients and professionals.2 8 The solution was thus for the Kansas
legislature simply to follow Ohio (one of only two other states to have
substantially adopted the UCSPA) in specifically excluding transactions between physicians and their patients from the law's application.29 In the long run, if the Kansas legislature follows Ohio's example, Williamson may be remembered as little more than a message
sent by the Kansas Supreme Court to the state's legislature to the
effect that a statutory amendment is in order.30 It will have served the
purpose of this essay, however, by evidencing the willingness of at
least one judge to recognize the impact of legislation on professionalism and then to urge necessary changes.

27 Is There a Duty to Treat?,supra note 8, at 356-57.
28 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-624(c) (2005).
29 Williamson, 152 P.3d at 69 (referencing OHIO

REv. CODE ANN. §
1345.01 (A) (LexisNexis 2000)).
30 A result which Dr. Amrani may contemplate with emotions unique to his
circumstance, having been the vehicle for conveying the message.
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C. Physician as Agent: The Common Law Context
Some of the discomfort we feel when professionals are forced into
the mold of commercial service providers by statutes such as the
KCPA is alleviated when we move to common law perspectives on
professionalism. The common law understood a professional to be a
special case of service provider, requiring more autonomy than would
ordinarily be expected in a commercial relationship; and that the status of the recipient of professional services must be adjusted
accordingly by the applicable rules of law. The common law therefore begins from the premise that the relationships between physician
and patient or lawyer and client are agency relationships. A physician
relates to his or her patient as an agent to its principal. Like other
agency relationships, that existing between doctor and patient is
created by reciprocal consent, often manifested in conduct rather than
in writing, and apart from the understanding that the doctor is acting
on behalf of the patient, any contract terms are typically implicit.
Among the most important of the implied obligations of the physician-agent to the patient-principal are fiduciary duties of loyalty and
care, 31 including the duty to put the interest of the patient first,32 to
avoid conflicts of interest,33 to act within the scope of the grant of
authority, 34 to keep the patient properly informed, 35 and to safeguard
the patient's confidences.3 6
So far, so good. But ultimately the doctor-patient relationship (at
least as it was historically conceived) sits uncomfortably within the
law of agency. The hallmark of an agency relationship is control by
the principal over the agent,37 and in this respect the medical professional historically fails to conform to agency norms. For its part,
professionalism traditionally insists upon autonomy, and to a degree
that denies any prospect of meaningful control by the patient. Witness
the (somewhat colorful) description of the sociologist Burton Bledstein of the culture of professionalism in 19 th century England and
America:

§ 8.01, 8.08 (2006).
Id. at § 8.01 cmt. b.
3 Id. at § 8.02 (prohibiting an agent from acquiring a material benefit from a
third party "in connection with transactions conducted or... taken on behalf of the
principal ... through the agent's use of the agent's position").
'4 Id.at § 8.09(1).
31 Id. at § 8.11.
31 RESTATEMENT (TRD) OF AGENCY
32

36

Id. at § 8.05(2).

37 Id. at § 8.01 cmt. b.
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The culture of professionalism released the creative energies
of the free person who was usually accountable only to himself and his personal interpretation of the ethical standards of
his profession ....

The professional appeared in the role of a

magician casting a spell over the client and requiring complete confidence ....

The uncertainty and anxiety of a client

heightened his receptivity to the commanding voice of professional authority. With such power over others, and with his
judgment usually beyond both public and professional criticism, the ambitious practitioner often could not resist the
opportunities for financial corruption.... Perhaps no Calvinist system of thought ever made use of the insecurities of
people more effectively than did the culture of professionalism. The professional person extended the gift of his special
powers to the client who was by definition unworthy of such
attention.... The state of a client's
dependence could become
38
psychologically unbearable.
To be sure, agency law accommodates the notion that the agent
may have more specialized knowledge than the principal, and thus the
agent would not be expected to function under the absolute control of
the principal; 39 but disequilibrium of the magnitude described by
Bledstein strains the legal fiction of agency to the breaking point.40
As between an ill-informed patient, often coming to the encounter in
physical and mental distress, and a well-trained physician working
within the scope of his or her specialty, any idea that the latter is operating under the authority and control of the former is likely to be the
merest pretense.4
In the terms of agency law, the patient is the principal and the
physician is the agent, consenting to carry out the patient's instructions. The applicability of this doctrine to the doctor-patient relationship, however, can almost immediately be called into question, since
38 BURTON J. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM

92, 94, 97,

102, 103 (W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1976), excerpted from pages 92-102.
39 See generally, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY intro. (2006) ("The
subject matter of this Restatement, the common law of agency, encompasses the legal
consequences of consensual relationships in which one person (the "principal") manifests assent that another person (the "agent") shall, subject to the principal's right of
control, have power to affect the principal's legal relations through the agent's acts
and on the principal's behalf.").
40 For an analysis of the informational problems of the health care consumer,
see Frank A. Sloan & Mark A. Hall, Market Failuresand the Evolution of State Regulation of Managed Care,LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2002, at 169, 172-77.
41 Supra note 12.
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the extent to which patients may be seen to instruct their physicians is
extremely limited. The problem is not merely that patients generally
do not know enough medical science to direct their physicians (this
would be true in agencies of many kinds, such as where automotive
mechanics or computer technology are involved), but that in addition
to the obvious asymmetry of knowledge fraught with moral hazard,
patients rely on their physicians to identify the problem as well as the
solution, and then again to determine whether treatment is possible or
appropriate, and finally to assess how successful any treatment may
have been.42 As a consequence it becomes difficult to apply the rules
of liability that normally attend agency law to doctors and patients.
Whereas it may be reasonable to hold a principal legally responsible
for the conduct of an agent acting within the scope of the agency, as in
the case of employer and employee, it is less obvious where a patient
could be held responsible for the conduct of his or her physician in
delivering health care, or even accountable for consenting thereto.
Not surprisingly, then, medical professionalism appears in agency
doctrine as a series of exceptions to rules. For instance, to the general
agency rule that an employer may be held vicariously liable for the
acts of an employee (the doctrine of respondeat superior), the law of
medical professionalism contributes the "captain of the ship" or the
"borrowed servant" doctrine, pursuant to which it is the physician
rather than the employer to whom liability for the negligence of
subordinate staff is vicariously transferred. Thus where the nursing
staff employees of a hospital commit negligent error in an operating
room, the surgeon in the theater and not the hospital can become
vicariously liable.43
But if it seems to require too much distortion to fit medical
professionals into the typical principal-agent mold, perhaps we should
look to another subcategory of agency law to accommodate the medical professional. Agency law, after all, contains several relationship
models, including those in which the agent retains relatively more
autonomy than is normally the case. Perhaps the nature of a doctor's
agency relationship to his or her patient is more like that of a corporate director to the corporation or its shareholders." Both physician
42

Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical

Care, 53 AM. ECON. REv. 941,

951

(1963).

See also ELIOT FREIDSON,

PROFESSIONALISM REBORN: THEORY, PROPHECY, AND POLICY 191 (1994) (explaining

that, because patients are not well-informed, well-equipped consumers, they are
unable to make choices and bargain as autonomous individuals in the market-place of
health care).
43 Synnott v. Midway Hosp., 178 N.W.2d 211, 213 (Minn. 1970).
44 See generally MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS:
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and corporate director, after all, are bound by a fiduciary duty to their
respective principals, but in both cases the duty is based on a managerial rather than a stewardship model. 45 Corporate directors are invited
to exercise their business judgment, even to the point of taking risks;
and they are allowed the leeway to determine in any given circumstance not only the objectives of the enterprise but also whether the
best interest of their charge aligns with that of shareholders or some
other corporate constituent.4 6 Similarly, the exercise of professional
judgment by physicians is often tolerated, even encouraged in law.47
The image of the physician as heroic risk-taker is well known. In
recognition of the autonomy of this kind of agent, the legal rules that
govern self-dealing are somewhat relaxed for medical professionals
just as they often are for corporate officials. Corporate officers and
medical professionals alike are permitted to make decisions that directly affect their compensation. a For their part, corporate directors
are granted at least partial relief from the general rule that agents must
fully inform their principals. Even majority shareholders do not have
a right to all the information to which management may be privy.
Similarly, in articulating the duty of physicians to inform their patients, courts have held that the standard is not absolute and complete
disclosure (which could sometimes be therapeutically counterindicated), but disclosure to the degree that a similarly-situated physician
would offer.49
In the last analysis, however, the duties of health care professionals should be differentiated from those of other fiduciaries such as
corporate directors. The analogy to the corporate fiduciary ultimately
192-96 (1993) (examining conflict-of-interest
scenarios present in the "law of corporations, pensions, and securities").
45 Neither physicians nor corporate fiduciaries, Rodwin observes, are held to
the restrictive standard for self-interested conduct set for pension fund managers
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") of 1974, P.L. 93-406
et seq. 129 U.S.C., § 1001 et seq. RODWIN, supra note 44, 192-96, citing ERISA §§
406-07 (listing prohibited transactions).
46 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (noting that "[i]t is a
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in
the best interests of the company"). See also Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d
717, 720 (Del. 1971) (affirming the business judgment rule, stating that "[a] board of
directors enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment, and its decisions will not
be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational business purpose").
47 See, e.g., Jeffrey O'Connell & Andrew S. Boutros, Treating Medical
MalpracticeClaims Under a Variantof the Business Judgment Rule, 77 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 373 passim (2002).
48 RODWIN, supra note 44, at 193.
49 FURROw supra note 12, at § 6-10(a).
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breaks down because the needs of a patient are fundamentally different from the needs of a shareholder. The corporate system of
delegated powers ultimately functions well because shareholders retain sufficient rights to information to protect their interests and sufficient authority over directors to enforce their rights. Patients, as I
have observed, often lack not only the capacity to understand the decisions with which they are being presented but also to evaluate
outcomes. As a result, health care is not an efficient market, capable
of correcting itself. Because a patient often relies on his or her physician to a significantly greater extent than does a shareholder on a corporate manager, 50 self-dealing is generally even less tolerable when
committed by medical professionals than by corporate fiduciaries.
Mark Hall aptly contrasts the nature of trust expected in health
care from that expected in commercial settings:
Trust is also important in other arenas such as those involving
commercial transactions, but trust plays a much greater role in
medicine. Trusting a financial institution or account manager,
even with one's life savings, is a much different proposition
from trusting a doctor to perform open-heart surgery or correctly diagnose a disabling ailment. People have many options for organizing their financial affairs, and their decisions
about how much authority to delegate and to whom are based
to a great extent on their appraisal of the competing costs and
benefits. Serious illness, in contrast, leaves one with little
choice but to see a doctor, and the nature of medical practice
permits some, but much less, control over what occurs during
treatment. Added to this, the realization that one's life or
physical and mental functioning is at risk creates much higher
stakes than do financial transactions. These features create
conditions of intense vulnerability, which magnify the role
that trust plays in medical relationships and put trust on a
much more emotional basis. This deeply personal type of
trust is paralleled only in fraternal, family, or love relationships.5 '
Agency law fails fully to accommodate professional relationships
for another reason that is important to appreciate for purposes of this
essay. Agency law as traditionally applied to health care matters does
not readily recognize all the interests involved in what we now
SO RODWIN, supra note 44, at 194.
51

(2002).

Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 471
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conceive to be medical professionalism. We are accustomed, that is,
to applying agency law to deal with the bilateral relationship of doctor
and patient, but not the triadic relationship that has come into being
with the advent of managed care or the wide range of other rules
imposed on health care transactions for the benefit of payors or of
society at large.52 The modem law of health care has evolved to
include the interest of a third party in many contexts-licensing
authorities and other governmental and non-government authorities,
insurance companies and other payors, the general public; but agency
law, although theoretically capable of addressing third party interests,
has for the most part lagged behind statutory law in adjusting to the
changes. We have moved from a world in which the principle that a
doctor's loyalty to patients was undivided and unrestrained to a world
in which rationing is becoming conceivable and managed care legislation has made acceptable a certain degree of conflicted interest on the
part of physicians. Indeed, in certain contexts scholars assessing the
relevance of agency to health care have observed that if we are to use
that concept, we must now wonder whose agent the physician is. It is
now no longer clear for whom the physician is acting at any given
moment, given the competing claims of the patient, the payor and the
public at large. 53 Simply put, agency law has not given us the tools
we now need to deal with matters involving more than two interests.
AN
II. THE LAW OF PROFESSIONALISM:
54
APPROACH
ESSENTIALIST
Professionalism has been viewed as a special case within agency
law or as a set of exceptions to other normative legal principles. For a
more positive definition we need what Mark Hall has called an essentialist approach to the subject.55 In addition, we need a definition that
accommodates all the parties that now claim an interest in profes-

52

Among the many sociologists who have explored the triadic nature of the

ERVING GOFFMAN, The Medical Model and Mental
Hospitalization:Some Notes on the Vicissitudes of the Tinkering Trades, in ASYLUMS,
321, 333-44 (1961) (identifying "community" as the third party in interest in the
triadic relationship in which the patient and psychologist are the other two); and
FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM REBORN, supra note 42, at 187-88 (identifying professional, bureaucratic and commercial interests); see generally FREIDSON,
PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC (2001).
53 GOFFMAN, supra note 52, at 333-44.
54 I wish to acknowledge a general debt of gratitude to Professor Charles
Bosk for 'uidancewith this aspect of this essay.
Hall, supranote 2, at 357.

modem medical relationship are
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sional transactions, not just the doctor and the patient. In this we can
profit from the literature of social science.
In the Report of the American Bar Association Commission on
Professionalism, Eliot Freidson observed that social science classifies
an occupation as a profession when it is determined
1. That its practice requires substantial intellectual training and the
use of complex judgments[,]
2. That since clients cannot adequately evaluate the quality of the
service, they must trust those they consult[,]
3. That the client's trust presupposes that the practitioner's selfinterest is overbalanced by devotion to serving both the client's
interest and the public good, and
4. That the occupation is self-regulating-that is, organized in
such a way as to assure the public and the courts that its members are competent, do not violate their client's trust, and transcend their own self-interest.56
Freidson's formulation derives from a significant body of literature in sociology. Before him, Talcott Parsons had used the terms
specificity of function, trust, disinterestedness and self-regulation to
describe the parameters of professionalism identified above by
Freidson. Specificity of function describes a profession's manner of
dealing with a large and complex body of knowledge. It is reflected
in the medical profession's organization according to training and
specialties. Trust is a core value in most descriptions of professional
relationships; it is evident in professional mandates to inform patients
as to diagnosis, prognosis and other aspects of their condition, and to
maintain confidentiality. Disinterestedness is the obligation of undivided loyalty or absence of conflicting self-interest clients and
patients require of professionals. Self-regulation is apparent in the
d6tente professionals have historically reached with government
through which professionals are accorded deference in matters within
the scope of their expertise.
56 COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, AM. BAR ASS'N, ... IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC
SERVICE: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 10 (1986),

available
at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/professionalism/StanleyCommission_
Report.pdf. Cf Nancy J. Moore, Professionalism Reconsidered, 12 Am. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 773, 778 (1987) (critiquing Freidson's definition of professionalism, stating
"[i]f this is the appropriate definition [of professionalism], then the Commission is
correct in concluding that a substantial decline in either the perception or the reality of
lawyer altruism would be cause for serious concern. However, it is doubtful that
there has been any such decline."); Ronald D. Rotunda, Lawyers and Professionalism: A Commentary on the Report of the American Bar Association Commission on
Professionalism,18 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1149 (1987).
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Among the advantages of a formulation such as Freidson's is the
fact that it not only informs our discussion of professionalism but also
organizes it. Note that the second and third of the identified characteristics involve relations between professionals and their clients or
patients, and that the first and last of the characteristics concern the
internal operation of the profession. Note also that the attributes are
sequenced: Because of the knowledge and skill barriers to entry into a
profession (or, within the profession, into a specialty), patients must
trust professionals; because patients must trust, professionals have an
obligation to avoid self-interest; and because of all these things, it is
both appropriate and necessary for the profession to regulate itself.
Looking ahead to this essay's enlistment of social science to
frame a legal construct, the list of core principles of professionalism
could be paired with legal issues as follows:
Legal Issue
Core Value of Professions
Antitrust laws (reguLicensure/
(issues
Functional specificity
lation of professional hegemony
dealing with training, credentials,
issues)
specialization)
Fiduciary obligations of profesTrust
sionals (confidentiality, informed
consent)
Divided loyalty and self-interest
Disinterestedness
issues (human subject research;
anti-kickback and self-referral
prohibitions; managed care incentives)
Governmental deference to a
Self-regulation
profession's establishment/ enforcement of standards (medical
hearing boards; peer review organizations)
A. Functional Specificity
One critical function of a profession involves its organization and
management of a specialized body of knowledge. The sociologist
Burton Bledstein describes this attribute as follows:
The intellectual pretensions of [professionals] were specific in
aim and definite in purpose. As professionals, they attempted
to define a total coherent system of necessary knowledge
within a precise territory, to control the intrinsic relationships
of their subject by making it a scholarly as well as an applied

2009]

LAW OF DOCTORING

science, to root social existence in the inner needs and possibilities of documentable worldly processes.57
Parsons used the phrase "specificity of function" to describe this
aspect of professionalism.5 8 It involves observing boundaries in
several contexts. Where the professional's technical competence is at
issue, functional specificity means recognizing that a given professional's knowledge and skill are limited to a particular "field." Where
contractual relationships are at issue, functional specificity means
observing only the specific rights and obligations explicit or implicit
in the agreement-what has been bargained for rather than what one
party may need and what the other can afford to give .59 Where a professional's position in an administrative or bureaucratic hierarchy is at
issue, functional specificity means recognizing and working within
the limits of the authority of an "office." At its core, functional specificity is about authority, and how it is acquired and maintained by
operating within boundaries. In the vernacular, it is about "turf,"
whether technological, administrative or occupational (and increasingly, economic).
As Freidson describes the attribute of professionalism he calls
"specialization," he strives to take technological, social and economic
elements into account concurrently. Here is his catalog of the attributes of professionalism relating to specialization:
1. specialized work in the officially recognized economy that is
believed to be grounded in a body of theoretically based, discretionary knowledge and skill and that is accordingly given
special status in the labor force;
2. exclusive jurisdiction in a particular division of labor created
and controlled by occupational negotiation;
3. a sheltered position in both external and internal labor markets
that is based on qualifying credentials created by the occupation;

57 BLEDSTEIN,

supra note 38, at 88.

58 "Thus in an ordinary case of commercial indebtedness, a request for mon-

ey on the part of one party will be met by the question, do I owe it? Whether the
requester "needs" the money is relevant, as is whether the other can well afford to pay
it. If, on the other hand, the two are brothers, any contractual agreements are at least
of secondary importance ....
Parsons, supra note 6, at 39.
59 In this respect, Parsons maintains, professional relationships, like commercial relationships, differ from kinship relationships, in which obligations and rights
are "diffuse" rather than specific, and accordingly a professional responds to any
request for assistance by asking why the assistance should be provided, rather than
why not.
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4. a formal training program lying outside the labor market that
produces the qualifying credentials, which is controlled by the
occupation and associated with higher education; and
5. an ideology that asserts greater commitment to doing good
work than to economic gain and to the quality rather than the
economic efficiency of work.60
Functional specificity is evident in the fifth principle of medical
ethics promulgated by the American Medical Association ("AMA"),
viz., "A physician shall continue to study, apply, and advance scientific knowledge, maintain a commitment to medical education, make
relevant information available to patients, colleagues, and the public,
obtain consultation, and use the talents of other health professionals
when indicated." The mandate includes homage to the importance of
science, with a nod to the obligation to defer to other specialties where
appropriate.
Transferring the idea of functional specificity into a legal context,
we find ourselves dealing with areas in which the law supports or
limits the medical professions in their efforts to create territorial
boundaries. An important legal counterpart of functional specificity is
the granting of monopolistic authority, such as through licensure. An
important curb on this monopolistic authority is antitrust legislation.
B. Trust
Classical sociological theory identifies trust as one of the key
elements of professionalism. The role it plays in medicine has been
aptly described by Mark Hall:
Trust is the core, defining characteristic of the doctor-patient
relationship--the "glue" that holds the relationship together
and makes it possible. Preserving, justifying, and enhancing
trust is a prominent objective in health care law and public
policy 6 1and is the fundamental goal of much of medical
ethics.
Among sociologists like Freidson, trust has both positive and negative
valences. 62 It is not only the leap of faith taken by a patient by reason
of the doctor's merit, but reliance which the patient has no choice in
placing, given his or her inability to evaluate the doctor's performance. The condition of trust in a patient proceeds in part from the fact
60 ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALIsM: THE THIRD LoGic (2001) at 127.

61 Hall, supra note 51, at 470-71 (citations omitted).
62 FREIDSON, supra note 60, at 214.
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that the gap in knowledge between the patient and the doctor is so
great that the patient can neither fully appreciate his or her condition
nor the success of its treatment by the doctor. From the vantage of the
physician, it is both an entitlement and a responsibility.
In the ethical codes of the medical profession, the subjects of trust
and loyalty are most readily evident in expressions of obligations of
confidentiality and service,
like these taken from the AMA's Princi63
ples of Medical Ethics:
IV. A physician shall respect the rights of patients, colleagues, and
other health professionals, and shall safeguard patient confidences and privacy within the constraints of the law.
And more generally:
VIII.A physician shall, while caring for a patient, regard responsibility to the patient as paramount.
Legal expressions of the essential principle of professionalism
relating to trust can be found in laws establishing the fiduciary obligations of physicians. They are outgrowths of agency principles such as
the duties of an agent to a principal with respect to information and
authorization. In health law terms, these become the principles of
confidentiality and informed consent. Statutory formulations of the
concept of trust have been advanced in cases under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") by plaintiffs arguing that
health care providers assume the fiduciary obligations of plan administrators when they act in the context of health plans that are employee
benefits. 64 Other statutory formulations of trust principles are more
specifically related to health care professionals.
It will be important to this essay to grasp a structural difference
between trust and functional specificity: the former involves the relationship between a doctor and patient while the latter involves conduct
internal to the profession of which the patient is only an indirect beneficiary. The same distinction can be drawn between the remaining
two core values, disinterestedness and self-regulation, the former
being relational and the latter being organizational.
C. Disinterestedness
The third of the characteristics of professionalism listed above by
Freidson involves the eradication of physician self-interest or divided
loyalty. If trust forms the basis of the relationship between doctor and
patient, disinterestedness is the justification for trust. The same qual63 AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,

Principlesof Medical Ethics, available

at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2512.html.
64 See, e.g., Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211,277 (2000).
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ity was earlier described simply as "disinterestedness" by Talcott
Parsons., 65 Parsons, a more unhesitating apologist for professionalism than Freidson, glossed the notion of disinterestedness with the
observation that it evidences a crucial distinction between professional
and commercial occupations.
For the dominant keynote of the modem economic system is
almost universally held to be the high degree of free play it
gives to the pursuit of self-interest. It is the "acquisitive society," or the "profit system" as two of the most common
formulas run. But by contrast with business in this interpretation the professions are marked by "disinterestedness." The
professional man is not thought of as engaged in the pursuit of
his personal profit, but in performing services to his patients
or clients, or to impersonal values like the advancement of
science. Hence the professions in this context appear to be
atypical, to some even a mere survival of the mediaeval
guilds. Some think that these spheres are becoming progressively commercialized, 66so that as distinctive structures they
will probably disappear.
And again:
The dominance of a business economy has seemed to justify
the view that ours was an "acquisitive society" in which every
one was an "economic man" who cared little for the interests
of others. Professional men, on the other hand, have been
thought of as standing above these sordid considerations,
devoting their lives to "service" of their fellow men.67
Although there is no explicit statement of subordination of selfinterest in the Principles of Medical Ethics promulgated by the AMA,
the idea is at least implied in the Seventh and Eighth Principles:
VII. A physician shall recognize a responsibility to participate in
activities contributing to the improvement of the community
and the betterment of public health.
VIII. A physician shall, while caring for a patient, regard responsibility to the patient as paramount.
The professional's obligation to remain disinterested is addressed
by legal principles relating to conflicts of interest. The law tends to
65

Parsons, supra note 6, at 35.

66id.
67 Id. at 43.
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offer either management or structural solutions to professional conflict
of interest issues. Management solutions are those in which professionals are given standards or guidelines for resolving conflicts, such
as rules stating the occasions for and the effect of obtaining a patient's
informed consent. Structural solutions are statues, regulations and
rules determining the degree of professional self-interest that may be
permissible, as with managed care, or simply prohibiting professionals
from putting themselves in a position where self-interest may arise in
the first place, such as anti-kickback laws and prohibitions against
fee-splitting and self-referrals.
D. Self-Regulation
In the eyes of the medical profession, its ability to self-regulate is
justified by its other attributes, the facts that it requires extensive
training and deals with highly scientific and technological information, that it warrants (and that its consumers rely upon) trust, and that
its members avoid self-interest. Indeed, in Freidson's formulation of
self-regulation as a characteristic of the legal profession, it is the
culmination of the other attributes, all of which are related
cumulatively:
[T]he occupation is self-regulating-that is, organized in such
a way as to assure the public and the courts that its members
are competent, do not violate
their client's trust, and transcend
68
their own self-interest.
Because the medical profession is functionally specific, and
because its subject matter is abstruse and requires extensive training,
the reasoning goes, consumers must trust; and because trust is essential, professionals must scrupulously avoid self-interest; and because it
has all these attributes, the medical profession is entitled to, and in
fact must regulate itself. Underlying all this reasoning is the assumption that professionalism is not fundamentally a commercial undertaking. Professionalism is the special province in which market rules are
not needed, and where they fail in any event. Professions may selfregulate, it is argued, because the system of regulation forged in the
commercial world is not apt and is not needed.
Our willingness to allow professionals to regulate themselves is
evidence of our belief that professionals are essentially different from
commercial actors. For Parsons, "professionalism" and "commercialism" were fundamentally antithetical, and it was the non-commercial
68 COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 56, at 10.
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aspect of professions that qualified those occupations to make their
most important contributions to society. As they "stand[] above [the]
sordid considerations" of commerce, professionals are the trustees of
their respective bodies of knowledge, preserving them for the general
good.69 Professionalism is more than a set of exceptions to norms, as
common law seems to have it, but rather a separate and critically
important estate within society. With his notion of the essentially
altruistic motivation of professionals, Parsons is in line with the tradition of sociologists such as Carr-Saunders and Wilson, who argued
that the role of professions, like that of other non-commercial
institutions, is to stabilize democratic society: The professions
inherit, preserve and hand on a tradition. .

.

. Professional

associations are stabilizing elements in society. They engender modes of life, habits of thought and standards of judgement which render them centres of resistance to crude forces
which threaten steady and peaceful evolution.... It is largely
due to them and to other similar centres of resistance that the
older civilizations stand firm ....

The family, the church and

the universities, certain associations of intellectuals, and
above all the great professions, stand like rocks against which
the waves raised by these forces beat in vain. 70
In more recent times, to be sure, social science has questioned the
non-commercial nature of professionalism, sometimes with disappointment and sometimes in the context of a search for other justifications for the institution of professionalism. Freidson seems to have
espoused both viewpoints during his career, at one point acknowledging (with evident regret) the inevitability of self-interest on the part of
the modem professional, but in the end elevating the professional to
the status of a third ideal type needed to counterbalance the other two,
free market
and bureaucratic types, in order for society to function
71
optimally.
69 Parsons, supra note 6, at 43.
70 A. M. CARR-SAUNDERS AND P.A. WILSON, THE PROFESSIONS 497 (Frank

Cass & Co. Ltd. 1964) (1933).
7' FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM REBORN, supra note 42, at 184. Freidson
acknowledges the inadequacy of what he identifies as the free market (consumerism)
to restrain the tendency of medical professionals to organize and operate for their

exclusive advantage. He pictures the free market, the bureaucratic market (hierarchically organized), and the professional market in an uneasy stasis, each inclined to
function in self-interest. Id. at 184-94. In his last book, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD

LoGic (2001), professions become a transcendent ideal with a right to autonomy and
an obligation to exercise their power benevolently (221), in service of a "larger good"
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Recognition of the right of self-regulation is evident in Principles
II, III and VI of the AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics:
II. A physician shall uphold the standards of professionalism, be
honest in all professional interactions, and strive to report
physicians deficient in character or competence, or engaging
in fraud or deception, to appropriate entities.
III. A physician shall respect the law and also recognize a responsibility to seek changes in those requirements which are
contrary to the best interests of the patient.
VI. A physician shall, in the provision of appropriate patient
care, except in emergencies, be free to choose whom to
serve, with whom to associate, and the environment in which
to provide medical care.
The law acknowledges the right of a profession to regulate itself
where its claims to do so are based on the profession's other inwardlooking core value, functional specificity. Thus where the medical
profession sets out to monitor its members' compliance with standards
of care, for instance, the law defers to the profession. Where the
rights of the public and other third parties are implicated, however, the
law engages in careful line-drawing. Medical hearing boards and peer
review organizations are witnesses to this.
III. A METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING
THE EFFECT OF CODIFICATION ON
MEDICAL PROFESSIONALISM
In the pages that follow I will examine selected cases in which
courts are called upon to adjudicate issues arising where statutory law
impinges upon the core values of medical professionalism outlined
above. I propose here a uniform approach to these cases consisting of
asking the following questions:
1. Is one of the core values of medical professionalism at issue?
2. What interests are implicated in this value? (i.e., is the value
one that principally involves the profession's internal organization and management, affecting patients and others only
indirectly, or is the value essentially relational, in which case,
besides the practitioner, what second and third party interests
are involved? Patients? Payors? The general public? The
"greater good"?)
3. Has the law in question adequately identified and reasonably
accommodated the interests that are implicated?
(217).
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I suggest that these questions comprise the elements of a methodology with which lawmakers and decision makers can both identify
circumstances in which professionalism may be at risk of unintended
consequences and consider what, if anything, should then be done.
IV. THE CODIFICATION OF MEDICAL
PROFESSIONALISM
In this essay I refer to the process by which common law
doctrines that have shaped our concept of professionalism are being
replaced by statutory formulations as codification. Codification
affects the different core values, or defining attributes of professionalism identified above differently, as the next section of this essay will
endeavor to demonstrate. But in certain important respects, codification affects all aspects of professionalism alike. For one thing, standards of conduct become more uniform across local and regional
lines. There is no longer a need to refer to the conduct of similarly
situated professionals of like kind within a given community, or to
determine the applicable standard on a case-by-case basis, where a
rule of law has interceded. Seen from the vantage of governmental
(and particularly federal) purchasers of health care services, this
uniformity is for obvious reasons a positive development. Local
professionals, however, are apt to experience the change as an intrusion upon their autonomy. For another thing, codification inevitably
changes professional conduct in more fundamental ways, accelerating
the shift from a culture of responsibility to one of rights as mentioned
above. Where a statute or regulation has established the limit of what
is permissible in terms of, say, economic self-interest, that limit
becomes extremely seductive, and often replaces community-based
standards of conduct. Why ruminate about what colleagues would or
should do when the law has drawn a bright line upon which all professionals within a group may be presumed to be walking? If a regulatory agency has established a safe harbor allowing an employer to
compensate a professional employee in a manner that induces referrals, with the result that all other employers in the industry can be
presumed to be conducting themselves accordingly, why should any
individual employer or the professional employee pause to consider
whether any such referral is defensible from a professional standpoint? The bright line established by the regulation tends to replace
any sense of professional responsibility that may have pre-existed it,
and it is thus that a culture of responsibility can by degrees be transformed into a culture of rights.
This is not to say that codification is in all cases a bad thing, an
evolutionary force that it is the duty of decisional law to oppose.
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Legislatures, after all, are in many respects better instruments of social
policy than courts. A doctor and patient in a mutually satisfactory
relationship are not concerned with the problem of providing others
with access to care, nor, where insurance or some other third-party
payor picks up the tab, are they likely to be sensitive to costs. These
critical concerns are left to policy makers and legislators to address.
Statutory law has led the way for beneficial health care policy change
in recent decades, and it is to be hoped it will continue to do so.
A. Functional Specificity
I focus here on two areas in which codification has affected the
core attribute of professionalism referred to above as functional specificity, namely, licensure and antitrust laws. These two areas of law
are particularly useful for present purposes not only because in both
instances the concept of medical professionalism has been palpably
transformed by codification, but also because the statutes in question
represent two very different approaches to professionalism and have
produced two significantly different effects upon it. State licensure
laws involve legislative grants of authority within a specific "field,"
either medicine in general or, as the case may be, a specific area within medicine. Such grants may either be exclusive and monopolistic,
or non-exclusive. State and federal antitrust laws, on the other hand,
involve limitations on monopoly.
Functional specificity is to a large extent an internal matter where
the medical profession is concerned, as I have noted above. Any
interest of patients in the outcome is derivative and arguably subordinate to the interest of professional groups themselves. The interest of
payors, including patients to the extent that they are responsible for
the cost of professional services, is nevertheless implicated. Licensure laws that allow professionals of lower skill levels to provide services that would otherwise cost more or be unavailable have an obvious effect on the public. Licensure laws involve primarily the intraprofessional concern of hegemony and secondarily the societal concerns of cost and access to services. When statutory issues arising
from licensure laws are brought before courts, they have understandably tended to act with deference to the professions with respect to the
manner in which they organize themselves to manage the body of
knowledge with which they are charged; but courts have tended to
abate their deference and to credit legislatures with relatively more
authority where the cost of services or public access to services are the
issue and the claims of the profession are relatively weak. Antitrust
laws, on the other hand, do not take professional values into account
at all.
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1. Licensure Laws
Licensure is the instrument with which government endorses a
professional body's authority to establish its competency boundaries.
The effect of a license may be to grant a certain professional group a
monopoly in a given practice are, or merely to grant the group a nonexclusive right to it. The latter type of licensure statute is sometimes
referred to as "open." Legal disputes sometimes arise when professional groups differ as to which of the foregoing types of law should
apply. Viewed with the analytic tool this essay advocates, the interest
of a professional disputant should be more compelling where issues of
practitioner competency, the integrity of scientific field, and quality of
care are at stake; and the interest of legislators should be more
compelling where the objective is to delineate economic hegemony or
to protect public and other third party interests.
One notable case in which a court was left to construe an "open"
statutory definition of professional field was Sermchief v. Gonzales.72
Here the Missouri Board of Registration for the Healing Arts
("Board") argued that the medical licensure statute operated to
prohibit certain conduct by nurses as the unlicensed practice of medicine.73 The nurses were providing family planning, obstetrics and
gynecology services directly to a low-income community through a
nonprofit agency ("Agency") pursuant to standing orders issued by
physicians in advance. The statute was drafted broadly to prohibit
anyone not licensed as a physician to "practice medicine or surgery in
any of its departments, 74 with certain exceptions. Among the exceptions was one for nurses "licensed and lawfully practicing their
profession within the provisions of [the nurse licensure statute]. 75
72 660 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
73 The legislation in question, the Nursing Practice Act of 1975, Mo. ANN.

§ 335.011-.257 (West 2008), was intended to expand nursing responsibilities
pursuant to the recommendations of several national commissions during the early
1970's. See DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, PUBL'N No. (HSM) 73-2037,
STAT.

EXTENDING THE SCOPE OF NURSING PRACTICE: A REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S

COMMrTEE TO STUDY EXTENDED ROLES FOR NURSES 8 (1971). See also NAT'L
COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF NURSING & NURSING EDUC., AN ABSTRACT FOR ACTION
(1970); NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF NURSING & NURSING EDUC., FROM
ABSTRACT INTO ACTION (1973). When the Missouri legislature enacted the Nursing
Practice Act of 1975, thirty states had similarly amended their laws regulating the
nursing profession. Audrey L. Ennen, Comment, Interpreting Missouri's Nursing
PracticeAct, 26 ST. Louis U. L.J. 931, 931 n.l (1982). After 1975, at least forty
states had broadened nursing practice statutes similar to the Missouri Nursing Practice
Act. Id..

74 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 334.010 (West 2008).
75 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 334.155 (West 2008).
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The nursing licensure statute in turn defined "professional nursing"
non-exclusively as "the performance for compensation of any act
which requires substantial specialized education, judgment and skill
based on knowledge and application of principles derived from the
In other
biological, physical, social and nursing sciences ... .
words, both the physicians' licensure law and that authorizing nursing
were written in deliberately open language, so that nurses, physicians
and courts were left to draw (and from time to time to redraw) the
boundaries of their respective fields. 7
Agency services provided by the nurses included the taking of patient histories; breast and pelvic examinations; laboratory testing of
Papanicolaou (PAP) smears, gonorrhea cultures, and blood serology;
the providing of and giving of information about oral contraceptives,
condoms, and intrauterine devices (IUD); the dispensing of certain
designated medications; and counseling services and community
education. Pursuant to their standing orders, the nurses would refer
patients to an Agency physician if they encountered certain specified
conditions.78 At trial, no evidence of harm to patients was introduced;
rather, the Board introduced expert witness testimony to the effect that
the services provided by the Agency nurses consisted of services typically provided by licensed physicians, and the nurses in turn produced
testimony to the effect that their conduct was within the scope of what
understood in that profession to be the practice of nurswas generally
79
ing.
The threshold question explicitly at issue on appeal was whether
Agency nurses could legally proceed under standing orders (rather
than direct physician supervision) to dispense medications and contraceptive devices, provide counseling and otherwise react to specified
conditions. 80 The Missouri Supreme Court determined the conduct
was permissible, based largely on its reading of legislative intent to
broaden the scope of nursing practice.8 ' It is clear from the firestorm
of amici briefs filed, however, that the case provoked concern about a
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 335.016(11) (West 2008).
77 See Barbara J. Safriet, Health Care Dollars and Regulatory Sense: The
Role ofAdvanced PracticeNursing, 9 YALE J.ON REG.417 (1992), for a review of the
76

literature on the relative quality implications of practice by medical doctors and
nurses.
71 Sermchief,660 S.W.2d at 684.
79 Id.at 685.
80 Id. at 686.
81 Id. at 689-90. The court succeeded in appearing to avoid making health
policy, but in circumventing policy issues it may be accused of somewhat circular
reasoning, viz., answering the question as to the scope of nursing practice with reference to the scope of nursing training, skill and, well, practice. See id.
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number of substantive issues that were ultimately avoided by the
court.82 With some speculation, a list of the motives driving public
interest could have included concern for patient safety, for health economics (with physicians concerned to retain market share and payors
and legislators urging for physician extenders), and for an articulation
of public policy regarding family planning and birth control. The
parties themselves wanted scope of practice line-drawing rules, 83 and
they presumably hoped for principles broad enough for application for
general organizational and operational purposes. What they got
instead was statutory construction by a court wary of tripping an
"avalanche of ...malpractice suits" by declaring any given conduct
to be unauthorized. In this respect the court seemed unwilling to go
beyond holding, in effect, that nursing, like other departments of the
health care profession, is what it is, and that if the conduct of one
department happens to overlap with that of another, so be it.
Typical of such cases, 4 Sermchief must have been disappointing
to those looking either to settle a wider range of professional border
disputes or to see the court make substantive policy. The court's
answer to the question, "What constitutes nursing and what the practice of medicine?" might loosely be characterized as follows:
"Nursing is conduct not inconsistent with nursing training, skill and
practice generally, and in any case includes reacting appropriately to
conditions stipulated in advance by physicians under standing orders."
It was left to each profession, or each department within it, to determine its boundaries in the legislative scheme then in place in
Missouri. Indeed, the court acknowledged the occupational selfawareness of nurses as if it were an attribute of professionalism
generally: "The hallmark of the professional is knowing the limits of
one's professional knowledge. ' 5 And while each branch of the health
care profession may regulate internally, it may not assume that statutory systems like Missouri's or the law of professions generally
bestows any right to exclusivity.
Disappointing as Sermchief may have been for the litigants seeking positive determinations of their rights relative to each other, from
the perspective of this essay the court's restraint may be justified.
82 See id.
at 685-86.
83

Id. at 688 ("The parties on both sides request that in construing these stat-

utes we define and draw that thin and elusive line that separates the practice of medicine and the practice of professional nursing in modem day delivery of health
services.").
84See also State Bd. of Nursing v. Ruebke, 913 P.2d 142 (Kan. 1996)
(determining whether midwives were engaged in the practice of medicine).
85 Sermchief 660 S.W.2d at 690.
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Applying the methodology described above, first, we can answer affirmatively that the case involves a core, defining attribute of professionalism, namely, functional specificity. In this terrain the court was
obliged to defer to the arguments of the professions as to how they
should best organize internally in order to cope with the vast body of
scientific knowledge in their trust. The court's deference obligation to
the Board would admittedly have been greater had it been supported
by evidence of the scientific basis for such arguments, or evidence
that an adverse holding would impair quality of care. At the same
time, however, the court was justified in recognizing the secondary
interests of the public in the cost and access. Refer to the second
question in the methodology described above: what interests are
implicated in the core attribute in dispute? In this case, the "field"
authority of more than one branch of the medical profession is raised,
and these interests are being weighed against the interests of society in
controlling cost and increasing public access to professional services.
Had the issue been strictly knowledge-based, the principle of deference may have carried the day, one way or the other. To the extent
that the issue could also be framed in economic terms, however, the
court does not appear to find it problematic to acknowledge the
authority of the legislature and decide the case accordingly.
Referring to the third question in the methodology, did the
Sermchief court, and did the Missouri legislature before it, reasonably
accommodate the interests involved? History suggests they have. By
an overwhelming majority, the states have adopted nursing statutes
with broad language like that in Sermchiefsince the 1970s, ostensibly
to allow that profession room to self-define and evolve, but also to
create an environment in which more of the burden of health care can
be shifted to lower cost providers. Cases upholding legislative authority to enact non-exclusive licensure laws establish that the law may
take cost and access considerations into account in rule-making without undue harm to core principles of professionalism, at least until
professional advocates convince courts that professional skills, quality
of care or the integrity of medical knowledge will suffer.86
To view the case in terms of what it tells us about transformative
process, Sermchiefstands for the principle that there is relatively more
justification for legislative and judicial interference with professional
self-regulation where the interests of third parties are at stake than
where the issue is properly internal to the profession. By the same
86

See Jerry Cromwell, Barriers To Achieving A Cost-Effective Workforce

Mix: Lessons From Anesthesiology, 24 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y AND L. 1331, 1345-51

(1999).

HEALTH MATRIX

[Vol. 19:317

token, Sermchief evidences the law's growing cognizance of third
party interests as its concept of professionalism evolves. The interests
implicated in Sernchiefare not just those of doctors, or of doctors and
patients, but also those of society as a whole.
2. Antitrust Laws
Whereas licensure laws involve legislative grants of monopoly,
antitrust laws involve the reverse. Both kinds of statutes, however,
necessarily involve medical professionalism's defining attribute of
functional specificity. The interest of the medical profession in this
attribute is most compelling, we have noted, where medical knowledge is directly affected, and this has sometimes been the case in
disputes revolving around antitrust laws. To this we may add that the
interest of the medical profession in the quality of patient care must
also add to the strength of the profession's claim, and again this issue
has been implicated by antitrust laws. Professionalism stands on the
firmest ground when it seeks to defend its particular body of knowledge or the quality of the care professionals deliver. The problem for
decisional law in this area is that unlike licensure statutes, antitrust
statutes leave no room for deference based on such concerns.
Antitrust laws represent a purely economic agenda on the part of
legislatures: there is no "quality of care" defense under the Sherman
Act to a finding that a professional body has engaged in price fixing,
boycott or the like. 7 As we might expect, then, courts have been
more willing to challenge legislative supremacy where antitrust
disputes involving professionals have been concerned.
The potentially detrimental effect of codification on medical
professionalism is evident in the context of antitrust law. Antitrust
legislation is at least in part predicated upon the assumption that free
markets are in all significant respects superior to markets encumbered
by special arrangements among suppliers or consumers. Antitrust
laws seek to preserve commerce for fully-informed parties dealing at
arms' length. Professionalism, on the other hand, has historically
claimed for itself an exception to this rule on the grounds that marketplace principles do not apply in the relationship between doctor and
patient. For one thing, the AMA has argued, there is too much
"information asymmetry" to permit us to hope that consumers sifting
through the ranks of professionals will ultimately be able to discover
optimal combinations of price and quality.88 And for many years,
87

See, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447,462-63 (1986).

88

Am. Med. Ass'n v. Wilk 895 F.2d 352, 361 (N.D. I11.1987), cert. denied,

498 U.S. 982 (1990).
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courts acknowledged the validity of this claim on the part of professionals and carved a special place for them in antitrust jurisprudence.
Eventually, however, the courts acceded to legislative supremacy with
respect to antitrust issues, and in the process the traditional concept of
professionalism was transformed.89
There is virtually no room to accommodate the special attributes
of professionalism within antitrust statutes, and little room in doctrinal
professionalism for the logic of the market place. The Sherman
Antitrust Act prohibits what it defines as anti-competitive conduct,
without exception for conduct professionals have deemed essential for
preserving the integrity of their body of knowledge or the quality of
patient care. The Sherman Act and other antitrust statutes do so, as I
have said, on the assumption that free markets will efficiently assess
quality. Consumers of medical goods and services will eventually
find the optimal value combination of quality and cost. Advocates of
professionalism, however, argue that this market principle cannot
work in a health care context, because patients, unlike typical
consumers, are rarely in a good position to assess the quality of the
care they are given. The informational asymmetry in health care is
simply too severe for marketplace economics to work, and this fact,
apologists for professionalism have argued, deserves to be recognized
in the form of exceptions to the application of antitrust statutes. In the
case of antitrust law, they have argued, the codification of professionalism has proceeded without due awareness of the damage done to
professionalism itself.
Wilk v. American Medical Association90 is seminal for this purpose, since it squarely raises the functional specificity justification for
deference within the context of the economic program of the Sherman
Act. 9' Wilk was an appeal to the Seventh Circuit from a district court
holding 92 that the AMA violated § 1 of the Sherman Act by boycotting chiropractors with its promulgation and coercive enforcement of
the following Principle of Medical Ethics as then formulated (hereinafter referred to as Principle 3): "A physician should practice a method of healing founded on a scientific basis; and he should not voluntarily professionally associate with anyone who violates this princi89

See Thomas L. Greaney, Quality of Care and Market FailureDefenses in

Antitrust Health Care Litigation, 21 CONN. L. REv. 605 (1989), for a discussion of
whether it may be possible to raise a quality of care defense based on a market failure
argument.
1987), cert. denied, 498
90 Am. Med. Ass'n v. Wilk 895 F.2d 352 (N.D. 11.
U.S. 982 (1990).
9' 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
92 Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 671 F. Supp. 1465 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
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pie. ' 93
The plaintiff chiropractors argued that the AMA
enforced Principle 3 first by labeling chiropractics as "unscientific"
and then advising AMA members and other professional associations
that it was unethical to associate with chiropractors. Among the
district court's findings of fact were that the AMA's purpose was the
containment and elimination of the chiropractic profession and more
particularly that the AMA sought to monopolize the hospital health
care market.94 The AMA had drafted an accrediting standard for the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals that would have
excluded unscientific practitioners, and thus chiropractors from hospital staff, peer review committees and the like, and would have effectively denied chiropractors access to hospital clinical records, research
results, and to hospital x-ray equipment and other facilities.
It is clear enough that the provenance of Principle 3 was at least
nominally a professional concern for scientific method; the question
raised in Wilk was whether that concern made any difference within
the framework of antitrust law given the AMA's manifestly anticompetitive conduct. Would antitrust law stand aside in the presence
of one of the core parameters of professionalism? Two of the AMA's
responses warrant attention here. One argument was that its conduct
did not in fact offend principles of competition because they do not
apply in the medical services market. The second argument was that
anticompetitive conduct could be justified in the name of quality of
care.
The first of these two assertions was an argument to the effect that
Principle 3 had pro-competitive implications that counterbalanced its
anticompetitive conduct. The AMA argued that the market for medical services is one where there is "information asymmetry.
Patients
lack sufficient knowledge to evaluate the quality of medical services
and therefore avoid necessary and accept unnecessary treatments. The
medical market does not correct itself even after such mistakes are
made because patients do not know what result they should have
obtained. The result is "market failure," an environment in which
competition is at best inapposite and at worst damaging, as gullible
patients lured by false promises flee from good medicine and its
stability is jeopardized. Informational asymmetry is professionalism's
ultimate functional specificity rationale. It is the assertion that professionals are the guardians of a body of scientific knowledge and as
such deserve deference. In the form presented in Wilk, however, the
9' Id.at 1470.
94 Id.at 1471.
95 Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 895 F.2d 352, 361 (7th Cir. 1990).
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argument was rejected as "speculative" by the district court and the
Seventh Circuit agreed.96 The AMA's witness testified that an
empirical study could not be performed to determine the
pro-competitive effects of Principle 3. (Indeed the argument has
Catch 22 features to the extent that it is incapable of proof independent of circular self-assertion. Its adherents seem to be saying, "Allowing the market to value medical services would be against the best
interests of the market; take our word for it.")
The "market failure" argument has the advantage of having a
plausible place in Sherman Act analysis as a defense against claims of
unreasonable restraint of trade. It is fundamentally an assertion of
pro-competitive effect, and as such admissible as a defense.97 The
other AMA argument to be considered here, the so-called patient care
defense, has less statutory legitimacy. Quality of care is not recognized by the Sherman Act as a justification for anti-competitive
conduct. For decades, however, courts had held that "learned professions" were implicitly exempt from antitrust laws, and even after that
doctrine was abandoned 98 courts continued to propound exemptions
for the medical profession based on quality of care. The "patient
care" defense formulated by the Seventh Circuit in Wilk provided that
the AMA's boycott would not be subjected to per se analysis and
could be justified if the AMA established:
(1) that they genuinely entertained a concern for what they
perceive as scientific method in the care of each person with
whom they have entered into a doctor-patient relationship; (2)
that this concern is objectively reasonable; (3) that this concern has been the dominant motivating factor in defendants'
promulgation of Principle 3 and in the conduct intended to
implement it; and (4) that this concern for scientific method in
patient care could not have been adequately
satisfied in a
99
manner less restrictive of competition.
On the facts in Wilk, however, the AMA failed to establish that its
concern for scientific method rather than its desire to dominate its
market for economic reasons was its principal motivation, and that it
could not have advanced scientific methods in a manner less harmful
to competition.
96 Id.

97 Id.
98

See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).

99 Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207, 227 (7th Cir. 1983); Wilk, 671 F.
Supp. at 1470-71.

HEALTH MATRIX

[Vol. 19:317

Could the AMA have succeeded in Wilk in establishing either that
its conduct was pro-competitive or that it was justified in the name of
patient care? If so, Wilk would have constituted an impressive vindication of the classic concept of professionalism. It is unlikely, however, that courts would confer legally-enforceable exclusivity upon
the medical profession in the context of antitrust law any more than in
matters of licensure. To prevail in an argument to the effect that refusal to deal is pro-competitive, were the AMA to continue to try, it
would have had to establish objectively that it deserved to be the sole
arbiter of truth and that consumers are not in a position to question its
determinations. In an environment in which courts and legislatures
are expanding patients' rights such as informed consent, it is unlikely
that such a paternalistic premise could be accepted. For its part, the
patient care defense hangs on a thread even in Wilk, and was arguably
then already overruled by Indiana Federation of Dentists,100 which
rejected a quality of care defense by dentists who had withheld x-rays
requested by insurers.' 0' In Wilk the Seventh Circuit followed the
district court in rejecting the AMA's patient care defense on the
grounds that (1) the AMA failed to establish that its singular adherence to scientific method was objectively reasonable (evidence had
been admitted at trial to the effect that the AMA itself acknowledged
that chiropractic was effective against certain musculoskeletal conditions) and (2) the AMA failed to show that it could not have achieved
its goals using methods
less injurious to competition (such as a public
02
education campaign).

Viewed for its implications for the traditional concept that professionalism, the Wilk test for the patient care defense predetermines a
somewhat adverse result. Professionalism in its traditional mode asserts that the professional is exclusive arbiter of issues relating to scientific method, whereas the Wilk test insists that the scientific method
will prevail only where a court is convinced that it is objectively reasonable. Wilk establishes that the medical profession can be granted
100 FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 462-64 (1986).
101Id. But the court did decline to invoke per se analysis of the issue, as the
Sherman Act would normally require in a boycott situation: "Although this Court has
in the past stated that group boycotts are unlawful per se, ... we decline to resolve
this case by forcing the Federation's policy into the 'boycott' pigeon-hole and invok[W]e have been slow to condemn rules adopted by profesing the per se rule ....
sional associations as unreasonable per se ... and, in general, to extend per se analysis to restraints imposed in the context of business relationships where the economic
Id. at 458-59. Wilk, 671
impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious ....
F. Supp. at 1481. (The Wilk court maintained that it was consistent with Indiana Federation of Dentists on the grounds that it too was decided on a rule of reason basis.).
2
'o Wilk, 895 F.2d at 362-64.
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market dominance only when there is no pro-competitive alternative,
and suggests an educational campaign on the failings of chiropractic
as an alternative to boycott. But traditional professionalism is erected
on an assumption of irremediable informational asymmetry, which
seems an unlikely platform from which to launch an educational
campaign. It is difficult to imagine a successful campaign to teach the
public that it cannot reasonably expect to understand and evaluate the
medical services being provided to it.
The extent to which the Wilk court credited the AMA's patient
care defense evidences the reluctance of courts to apply normal antitrust analysis to the anti-competitive conduct of professionals. A
strictly commercial defendant would likely have been found liable on
a per se basis under the Sherman Act. The Seventh Circuit did ultimately reject the AMA's patient care defense, but maintained that it
warranted rule of reason rather than per se analysis because the
defense "involves a medical ethic which nonfrivolously addresses the
importance of scientific method, a subject well within the natural
ambit of a medical association." 10 3 Even this level of deference was,
however, without basis in antitrust jurisprudence, and therefore
ultimately fated to be discarded. Deference by the Wilk court and
others that have similarly sought to mollify the effect of the Sherman
Act on professions can probably best be viewed as judicial pleas
against all hope of success for a second look at the consequences of
antitrust legislation for professionalism. To a moderate degree administrative agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission have heeded
the call, establishing specific "safety zones" in which professional
conduct will not be prosecuted under antitrust laws. 1' 4 But such
measures do not alter the fact that a traditional attribute of professionalism-its autonomous control of certain "turf" issues-does not
apply within the framework of antitrust law. If we can concur that a
core value of professionalism is negatively impacted by antitrust
legislation, continued pressure upon that legislation seems likely.
My purpose is not to side with the AMA in Wilk, but to underscore the evident frustration of the court, and other courts confronted
with the same issue, when forced to apply rules designed for commercial application in the context of professionalism. In such circumstances, courts have repeatedly urged that more scope be allowed for
consideration of quality of care or to question whether marketplace
103 Wilk, 671 F. Supp. at 1480.
104 See Press Release, Department of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Policy

Statements Issued for Health Care Industry (Sept. 15, 1993), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press releases/1993/211661.pdf.
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assumptions apply to professions. As a society we may ultimately
wish to ignore such urgings and act instead to bring professions in line
with commercial actors. My purpose is merely to identify the circumstances in which we should acknowledge the transformative effect of
law upon professions, as courts have demonstrably already done from
time to time.
B. Trust
Professionalism's defining attribute trust acquires legal implications where the law seeks to define fiduciary obligations. This can
occur in the narrow context in which a professional may come within
the scope of ERISA's definition of a fiduciary, or more generally in
agency situations were the law seeks to redress harm arising from a
failure of the professional to act within the bounds of his or her agency. Trust is specifically implicated where legal obligations of confidentiality arise. A duty of confidentiality can arise in common law as
the obligation of the agent to safeguard information about the principal, 0 5 or under statutory law, such as the federal Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"). 10 6 The following sections of this essay will first develop the concept of
confidentiality as it emerges from common law, then examine the
effects of its "statutorification" in HIPAA.
Trust, as mentioned above, is a relational value, as distinguished
from the values of functional specificity and self-regulation, which are
predominantly internal concerns for professions. Functional specificity and self-regulation, that is, are aspects of the medical profession's
dealings with itself, whereas trust is an aspect of the relationship between professionals and their patients. As an instance of the core value of trust, confidentiality should also be relational. Accordingly, for
decisional or statutory law properly to address this value, the interests
of both the patient and the professional must be taken into
account.
1. Confidentiality
Claims that a professional has breached his or her fiduciary duty
of confidentiality often arise in dispute situations along with claims
involving breach of privacy; but as the court in Humphers v. First
InterstateBank of Oregon10 7 observes, there is a difference. Briefly
§ 8.05 (2006).
45 C.F.R. § 160.101 et seq.

105 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
'06 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2000);
107

Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 696 P.2d 527 (Or. 1985).
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stated, anyone can invade someone's privacy, but only a fiduciary can
breach a fiduciary duty such as the duty of confidentiality owed a
patient by a physician.'0 8 We may accordingly expect disputes about
a physician's duty of confidentiality to bring us into contact with one
of professionalism's core, defining attributes.
Humphers involved claims against a doctor's estate by a mother,
Ramona Jean Peek, who had put her child up for adoption at birth and
had sought thereafter to conceal her identity from the child. Upon
reaching majority, the child, Dawn Kastning, had prevailed upon Ms.
Peek's physician, Dr. Mackey, to assist in identifying and locating
Ms. Peek. To this end Dr. Mackey gave Ms. Kastning a letter falsely
stating that he had administered diethylstilbestrol (DES) to Ms. Peek
and that possible consequences of this medication to Ms. Kastning
made it important for her to find her biological mother. In reliance on
this letter, the hospital records department produced copies of Ms.
Peek's medical records for Dawn, who was then able to locate Ms.
Peek. Ms. Peek sought damages from Dr. Mackey's estate for
emotional distress.
By way of preface to the reading of Humphers that follows, my
purpose is to show the emergence of the concept of confidentiality in
a form uniquely relevant to professionalism. I believe the concept the
court ultimately formulates reveals something of the essential difference between professionalism and commerce, a fact that is evidenced
by the struggle of the court, first to forge a cause of action and a claim
that fit squarely in neither traditional (marketplace) contract nor tort
law, and then to find a basis for the concept among existing statutes
and codes.
As the case came to the Oregon Supreme Court, the district court
below had found for the defendant on the basis that the facts supported no theory of relief the plaintiff could advance. The plaintiffs
tort-based claims would have had problems of proof, while claims
sounding in contract would not have supported damages for emotional
distress. Ms. Peek's claim that Dr. Mackey's conduct was tortious
would have required expert testimony to the effect that such conduct
fell below the level of care at which other physicians in the community practiced in order to establish that a standard of care had been
'0' Id. at 530 ("If an act qualifies as a tortious invasion of privacy, it theoretically could be committed by anyone. In the present case, Dr. Mackey's professional
role is relevant to a claim that he breached a duty of confidentiality .... ). The court
reasoned that the confidentiality obligation of a physician to his or her patient is
unique: "If Dr. Mackey incurred liability ... it must result from an obligation of
confidentiality beyond any general duty of people at large not to invade one another's
privacy." Id. at 533.
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breached. Such evidence was not forthcoming. Moreover, her claim
that Dr. Mackey had intentionally inflicted emotional distress failed
upon findings of fact that Dr. Mackey had had no such intention, nor
had he acted recklessly. Contract-based claims faced not only the
difficulty of establishing any bargain for confidentiality (it would
have had to be implicit), but also the remedy problem (contract damages would not have yielded adequate recompense). To the extent
that any duty of confidentiality existed, the district court had reasoned,
it must ultimately have been grounded in contract, which would not
support damages for pain and suffering or emotional distress.
But Ms. Peek's needs could not be adequately addressed by contract theory. To find a legal theory that would help Ms. Peek, the
Oregon Supreme Court had to deal with the decades-old problem of
the misalignment of professionalism and the law of the marketplace.
A cause of action and a remedy had to be found that in many respects
were exceptions to the rules,'0 9 and in the process the legal parameters
of professionalism were being established. The Humphers court thus
defines a core attribute of professionalism by exploring the failure of
legal norms to account for it. First, the court acknowledged that it
was dealing with a uniquely professional issue, the alleged breach of a
fiduciary duty of confidentiality, and not the lay issue of invasion of
privacy. Then the court nodded to the contractual nature of the
doctor-patient relationship, but would have to infer that confidentiality
was a term of the contract. Confidentiality was implicit in the fact
that Dr. Mackey had registered Ms. Peek under a false name when she
gave birth to Dawn. Then the court wrestled with the tort nature of
the problem in considering the applicable standard of care. Did a
breach of the duty of confidentiality require expert testimony to establish the standard within the professional community, or could lay persons determine the level of confidentiality owed to a patient by a
doctor? Simply to ask the question is to acknowledge something exceptional about this core value. To consider the possibility that the
judgment of a lay person may be the measure of an aspect of a professional relationship is to recognize the bilateral (relational) nature of
the element of trust.

109 Id. at 529 ("A contract claim may be adequate where the breach of confidence causes financial loss, and it may gain a longer period of limitations; but
contract law may deny damages for psychic or emotional injury not within the contemplation of the contracting parties.... A contract claim is unavailable if the defendant physician was engaged by someone other than the plaintiff[."). But see Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 237 F. Supp. 96, 98-100 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (applying breach of contract theory).
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Ultimately the Humphers court had to resort to a degree of
"judicial innovation"' 10 to establish the theory upon which Ms. Peek
could state a claim, and in doing so the court illuminated one of
professionalism's defining values. The plaintiff needed a tort-like
remedy, but the claim of invasion of privacy was not available, nor
was there a finding of intentional misconduct of a magnitude sufficient for a claim of emotional distress. The court needed to identify a
confidential relationship that could give rise to tort damages. The
court also need this relationship to be "nonconsensual"-a duty to
keep a secret that was not based on contract, as it almost always is in
the commercial world. Indeed, the court needed to establish that the
doctor-patient relationship between Dr. Mackey and Ms. Peek was of
a nature that gave rise to an obligation of confidentiality on the part of
Dr. Mackey not to disclose confidential information to Dawn, as the
duty of confidentiality had not previously been defined to cover that
circumstance under Oregon law."l' To this end the court searched for
a statutory basis for Dr. Mackey's obligation to Ms. Peek, because a
statute could define the obligation and the remedies for its breach
without having to fit within the norms of either tort or contract law.
Without going into the particulars of the Oregon statutes from which
the court sought to infer a nonconsensual, fiduciary duty of confidentiality owed by physicians, suffice it to note here that the Humphers
court concluded that what it needed could be found in a combination
of professional licensure statutes" 12 (some of which established a physician's compliance with the regulations of professional organizations
as a condition to licensure),' 3 rules of evidence (the patient's statutory privilege to exclude his or her physician's testimony in litigation' 14) and adoption laws (sealing records). Having inferred from
these statutes a basis for a fiduciary duty, the court could recognize a
"lo Humphers, 696 P.2d at 532 (admitting implicitly that a degree of innovation is required, but less than the lower court had evidently believed necessary).
Id.at 535.
112 See also Berry v. Moench, 331 P.2d 814 (Utah 1958); Felis v. Greenberg,
273 N.Y.S.2d 288, 290 (1966); but see Moses v. McWilliams, 549 A.2d 950, 955 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1988) (determining that the right to confidentiality conveyed by the
Pennsylvania physician-privilege statute is not absolute).
"i' Humphers, 696 P.2 at 534, n.15 (citing cases in other jurisdictions sustaining professional constraints on disclosure if disclosure is incompatible with professional function).
114OR. REv. STAT. § 40.235(2) (2007). It is important to note that this is only
a testimonial privilege and not a true confidentiality obligation. See id.The patient
may exclude confidential information from the evidence presented in court, but cannot use the same privilege to prevent a doctor from disclosing the information to other
third parties. See id
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cause of action unique to a professional relationship.1 5 Dr. Mackey
owed a duty of a nonconsensual and thus not entirely contractual
nature, the remedy for which could, as in a tort action, be punitive, but
whose parameters would ultimately be established by code rather than
common law.
The Humphers court gives us no single, definitive standard
against which to measure the duty of a physician to keep a patient's
secrets, except to say that the duty "is determined by standards outside
the tort claim for its breach," and accordingly "so are the defenses of
privilege or justification."" 6 There is no catch-all standard for finding
the level of confidentiality or identifying permissible disclosures, such
as "what the reasonable, similarly-situated physician would do," or
"what the reasonable patient would expect." Rather, defenses to the
duty of confidence vary according to the particular statute or other
source of that duty under the given circumstances. In the case of an
infectious disease or child abuse, for instance, the applicable statute
may require disclosure.1 7 In other civil actions the standard may be
different.
Applying the methodology proposed in this essay, first, it seems
clear that a core value of professionalism-trust--is at issue, not only
because confidentiality is inherently a "trust" matter, a fiduciary obligation, but also because the court has taken pains to underscore the
fact: "If an act qualifies as a tortious invasion of privacy, it theoretically could be committed by anyone.
In the present case,
Dr. Mackey's professionalrole is relevant to a claim that he breached
a duty of confidentiality....
Second, it is apparent that the court
has identified the various interests implicated by this value, those of
the physician and his patient(s), and third, the court has sought to take
all these interests into account. Had Dr. Mackey's letter not been
fraudulent and Ms. Kastning had been a DES baby, the court suggests
that not only would Ms. Kastning have had a cognizable interest in
finding Ms. Peek but Dr. Mackey might also have been privileged to
assist her." 9 When it comes to establishing a standard with which to
115 Humphers, 696 P.2d at 533 (stating that "The point of the claim against

Dr. Mackey is not that he pried into a confidence but that he failed to keep one. If
Dr. Mackey incurred liability for that, it must result from an obligation of confidentiality beyond any general duty of people at large not to invade one another's privacy.").116

Id. at 535.

117 Id.

118 Id. at 530 (emphasis added).
119 Id. at 535 (mentioning other justifications and privileges, to include a
physician's duty to report certain diseases in the interest of public health and a privilege found in some cases to report certain health information to a patient's spouse).
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determine liability in future cases, however, Humphers can only take
us so far without help from the Oregon legislature. Since the theory
of confidentiality advanced by Humphers lies fully within neither tort
not contract, there is no common law standard; and since the duty
depends on which of several possible statutory sources applies to the
20
circumstances at hand, there is no uniform statutory standard either.
It will be noted that this is not a case where the court arrives at the
sensitive juncture of law and professionalism and then seeks to induce
a change in a legislative scheme that appears to impair professionalism. Rather, Humphers is a case where legislation has not yet defined
the core value, and is needed for the purpose. A legislative pronouncement is needed not only because common law is evidently not
up to the task, but also because standards need to be set so that the
competing interests of the parties involved can be prioritized. If the
Humphers court is calling out for anything from the Oregon legislature, it is for action rather than revision. The call would eventually be
answered by HIPAA, among other privacy statutes.
2. HIPAA
HIPAA and regulations thereunder solve the problem confronted
by the Humphers court by creating an explicit statute-based articulation of the physician's duty of confidentiality and the patient's right to
privacy. Subpart E (Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health
Information) establishes standards for the use and disclosure of
protected health information, making it clear that patients have a
privacy right to such information except as expressly permitted or
required by the act.121 Permitted uses and disclosures include those
for treatment and payment, among others, and those undertaken
pursuant to valid authorization. Had HIPAA been available to Ms.
Peek, her case would have been open and shut, and Dr. Mackey would
arguably have been per se liable for violating her privacy right.
Measured by the objectives of the Humphers court, and viewed in
the light of the methodology advocated in this essay, HIPAA is a
120

But see Doe v. Medlantic Health Care Group, Inc., 814 A.2d 939, 950-51

(D.C. 2003) (finding a 'tort of breach of confidential relationship is generally described as consisting of the unconsented, unprivileged disclosure to a third party of
nonpublic information that the defendant has learned within a confidential relationship"' that "arises from a duty . . . [that] imposes an obligation-stricter than the
reasonable person test-to 'scrupulously honor the trust and confidence reposed in
them because of that special relationship ... ') (quoting Vassiliades v. Garfmckel's,
Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 591 (D.C. 1985)).
121 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2007) (referencing subpart C of § 160 of the subchapter).
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reasonable solution to the problem raised in Humphers. It proceeds in
evident awareness that a core value of professionalism is at stake, and
that the nature of that value is relational. HIPAA, that is, accommodates the needs of patients for confidentiality and autonomy, but
simultaneously accommodates the needs of professionals and those of
certain third parties as well. In addition to uses and disclosures
permitted by patient authorization, HIPAA recognizes that a variety of
uses and disclosures are necessary even without consent, as when
required by another law (e.g., a child abuse reporting law). 122 Like the
Humphers court, HIPAA strives for a balance between the privacy
needs of the patient and the requirements of professional autonomy,
including the need for certain uses and disclosures of confidential
information where the interests of others may be impacted. HIPAA
clearly establishes a standard for any permitted or required use or
disclosure, however, and this is generally a requirement that the applicable party use or disclose protected information only to the minimum
extent necessary for the use in question.
Where the legal construct of professionalism is concerned,
HIPAA is ultimately both a blessing and a curse. It obviates the need
of courts to navigate between tort and contract law to construct a concept of professional fiduciary duty, but its adequacy in this respect has
the ironic effect of transforming professional conduct. Where the
standards are established by law, they may no longer be established by
the profession itself, or with reference to the objective standard of the
similarly situated professional. HIPAA demonstrates an inescapable
consequence of codification: once bright lines for permissible and
impermissible conduct are drawn by statute, professional behavior
invariably travels along those lines. The question ceases to be what
brother and sister professionals would or should do in any given situation and becomes, what does the law permit or prohibit. This is the
way a culture of responsibility is transformed into a culture of rights.
Where there is gain in clarity of rules of conduct, there is a corresponding loss of professional self-awareness.
C. Disinterestedness
Disinterestedness is the third core attribute of professionalism,
and the second of two that directly involve the provider-patient relationship. Professionalism requires that the physician not have a
personal stake in the rendering of care. Law enforces this obligation
by prohibiting kickbacks and by regulating human subject research,
122 § 164.512.
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among other things. As with the core parameter trust, disinterestedness involves the relationship between medical professional and
patient, and often that between the medical professional and society as
well.
1. Human Subject Research
The core value disinterestedness prohibits physicians from being
motivated by any interest other than the welfare of patients. But as
one court has astutely observed, there is always conflicting professional self-interest where human subject research is concerned:
There is always a potential substantial conflict of interest on
the part of researchers as between them and the human
subjects used in their research. If participants in the study
withdraw from the research study prior to its completion, then
the results of the study could be rendered meaningless. There
is thus an inherent reason for not conveying information to
subjects as it arises, that might cause the subjects to leave the
research project. That conflict23dictates a stronger reason for
full and continuous disclosure. 1
Self-interest on the part of the professional in the context of
human subject research is sometimes disguised as altruism, as where
the medical researcher defends a breach of a duty to a patient as something that advances the greater good. But it has been an established
principle of both law and medical ethics since Nuremberg that
subordination of a
advancement of the greater good does not justify
124
patient.
her
or
his
to
duty
underlying
doctor's
The compatibility of our concept of professionalism and the regulatory framework established under the National Research Act of
1974 to govern human subject research can be assessed with this
essay's methodology as follows: That the regulations acknowledge the
presence of the core value of disinterestedness (whether explicitly or
Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 850-51 (Md. 2001).
In human subject research cases, courts tend to consider the claim of the
"greater good" to be weak. In contrast, in situations where claims of society are
made, public policy often provides for allocation of medical resources, such as
managed care. Since the promulgation of the Nuremberg Code, courts have not given
significant weight to arguments for advancing the greater good of society at the
expense of individuals. See, e.g., id. at 850, 853 (stating it is not in any healthy
child's best interest "to be intentionally put in a nontherapeutic situation where his or
her health may be impaired, in order to test methods that may ultimately benefit all
children"). Therefore, human subject research cases have the greatest impact where
conflicts exist based on self-interest rather than divided loyalty.
123

124
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not) is evident from their systematic attention to conflict of interest
problems. The regulations deal with the problem structurally by
establishing independent and multidisciplinary Institutional Review
Boards ("IRBs") to oversee research projects. The objective of IRBs
is to safeguard against both the abuse of researcher self-interest and
125
that of exploitation of the research subject "for the greater good.
The regulations seek to assure IRB impartiality using both affirmative
and negative mandates. Section 46.107 establishes diversity requirements for IRB composition, and section 46.107(e) expressly precludes
anyone with a conflict of interest from serving. The regulations also
deal with the problem of conflicts of interest substantively by establishing requirements for appropriate informed consent by patients
(§46.111), and when necessary by appropriate representatives
(§46.102(c)).
Further, the regulations acknowledge all the interests involved in
the core value at issue and seek to accommodate their respective
needs. The parties in interest are professional researchers, the
research subjects and the public. The needs of professional researchers are accommodated by representation on IRBs of "at least one
member whose primary concerns are in scientific areas" (§46.107(c)),
for one thing. For another, the regulations are drafted so as not to
intrude upon a purely therapeutic undertaking by a physician, even if
it may be innovative in nature (§46.101(b)). Protecting the needs of
the subject is the prime objective of the "Policy for the Protection of
Human Research Subjects" that has guided development of the regulations. By way of illustration of this motive, the regulations provide
that certain risks are not waivable, even by fully informed consent, if
the risk is not reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits
(§46.111(a)). But by definition human subject research is ultimately
intended to benefit the public at large, and thus the regulations admit a
risk-benefit calculation. The regulations are, however, particular as to
the nature of the benefit that may be thrown into the balance against
personal risk. Long-range "greater good" returns, or rewards in the
form of measured effects on public policy, for instance, cannot be
taken into consideration when determining whether to tolerate
personal risk (§46.111 (a)(2)).
All evidence of a well-balanced regulatory regime fully capable of
accommodating the requirements of professionalism notwithstanding,
a 2001 case in the Maryland Court of Appeals shows that a further
look at the regulations can still be necessary. Grimes v. Kennedy
Krieger Institute, Inc. involved a nontherapeutic research program
12'45 C.F.R. § 46.
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conducted by the Kennedy Krieger Institute ("KKI"), a research entity
associated with Johns Hopkins University, to assess the relative effectiveness on the health of children of various levels of lead paint abatement in their homes.' 26 KKI arranged for lead paint abatement in
differing degrees in several test homes. 127 Where the homes were not
already inhabited by families with children, KKI induced landlords to
rent to such families.128
KKI encouraged the families to
remain in these homes throughout the test period, during which KKI
researchers regularly analyzed the blood of the subject children for the
effects of lead contamination. 129 Participants in the program tended to
be lower-income, and in at least one case minority families, possibly
through self-selection. 130 KKI presented its research protocols for
3
approval to the Johns Hopkins IRB, among other oversight bodies.' '
The plaintiffs alleged not only that the protocol was inherently flawed
in that it contemplated the exposure of otherwise healthy children to
environmental contamination, but also that the study was not properly
implemented in that subjects were not timely warned of health risks
32
from lead dust during the course of the study.
In conducting its study, the Grimes court observed, KKI was necessarily subject to conflicting self-interest, even if not of a material
economic nature.' 33 There was not only the concern that subjects becoming aware of the existence of levels of lead dust in their homes
might prematurely withdraw from the study, thereby diminishing its
value, but also the inherent conflict in the competing "need to test
hypotheses and the requirement
to respect and protect individuals who
34
participate in research.'
However noble the investigator's intentions, when research
involves human participants, the uncertainties inherent in any
research study raise the prospect of unanticipated harm. In
designing a research study an investigator must focus on finding or creating situations in which one can test important sci-

127

Grimes, 782 A.2d at 811-13.
Id.

121

Id. at 812.

126

Id.
Id.
131Id.
129
130

132 Id. at 841.
133KKI emphasized at trial that it was something of an "institutional volun-

teer," lacking a profit motive. See id.
at 832.
134Id.at 851 (citing 1 NAT'L BIOETHICs ADVISORY COMM'N, ETHICAL AND
POLICY ISSUES INRESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS 2-3 (2000)) (internal
quotations omitted).
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entific hypotheses. At the same time, no matter how imporhuman
tant the research questions, it is not ethical
35 to use
participantswithout appropriateprotections.1
36
Taking into account the vulnerability of the subject population,'
and the fact that participants were provided with no therapeutic benefit under the study (indeed, the study anticipated lead accumulation in
the blood of otherwise healthy children), 137 the Maryland Court of
Appeals held that not even fully-consented disclosure could have satisfied the researchers' duty to the subjects:

[P]arents, whether improperly enticed by trinkets, food
stamps, money or other items, have no more right to intentionally and unnecessarily place children in potentially
hazardous nontherapeutic research surroundings, than do
parental consent, no matter how
researchers. In such cases,
38
insufficient.
is
informed,
Grimes advances the principle that there are certain sorts of judgments for which professionals, as such, cannot transfer responsibility.
This constraint effectively defines professionalism. Whether the relationship between researchers and their subjects is a professional relationship is perhaps open to discussion, and admittedly a related issue
was decided in the negative in the court below. There, KKI successfully argued that the sole basis of any relationship between its
researchers and their subjects was a signed consent, by which parents
permitted researchers to conduct observations. There was no contract,
KKI argued, no agreement to treat, no privity; nor was there any
"special relationship" from which a duty sounding in tort might
arise, 139 and thus no legal basis upon which to erect an obligation to
warn or otherwise guard against risks inherent in living in possibly
contaminated surroundings. 40 KKI successfully positioned itself
during the trial as something of an observer.' 4' It was important for
135

id.

136

Id. at 812, 852 (noting that the children and families involved in the study

were from lower economic backgrounds and were sometimes minorities).
117 Id. at 812-13, 852.
138

Id. at 814.
e.g.,

139 See,

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS

§ 41 (Proposed Final Draft

1999).
140

Grimes, 782 A.2d at 832 (noting this support as the trial court's basis for

granting summary judgment in favor of KKI).
V" Id. ("KKI was not the owner of the property, not an agent for the owner, it
didn't [accept] other properties from the landlord. It did not prefer the properties to
the landlord. There is no basis to suggest that KKI was anything more than an
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the Court of Appeals to establish both a bilateral agreement between
KKI and its subjects and a special relationship upon which to base
contract and tort duties, not only to advance the plaintiffs' case
beyond summary judgment but also, for the purposes of the discussion
at hand, to establish a cause of action based solely on consent and not
fully dependent upon the traditional doctor-patient relationship. 142 It
is significant for purposes of our consideration of professionalism, as
we shall see, that there exists a legal duty to avoid self-interest that
does not readily merge into other contract and tort claims arising from
the same underlying facts, and whose remedy is thus not likely to be
subordinated to those otherwise available in medical malpractice cases.143
In its analysis, the court takes notice of qualities that existed in the
relationship between KKI researchers and their subjects (any by
extension the relationships of professionals to their patients) that give
rise to special and non-delegable duties. The court first notes the
knowledge asymmetry that inevitably exists: "[G]iven the gap in
knowledge between investigators and participants and the inherent
conflict of interest faced by investigators, participants cannot and
should not be solely responsible for their own protection. ' 44 The
court further notes that KKI's reputation alone could justify certain
assumptions of professional conduct: "Faced with seemingly knowledgeable and prestigious investigators engaged in a noble pursuit,
participants may simply assume that research is socially important or
of benefit to them individually; they may not be aware that participation could be harmful to their interests.' ' 45 One could conclude that
the status of professionals as such can be enough to create special
expectations on the part of the patient and obligations on the part of
the physician.
What could KKI have done, given the inadequacy of disclosure
and parental consent to cure the conflict of interest problem inherent
in its study? Presumably it could have designed the study in a manner
that avoided any duty to the participants. This would mean taking no
institutionalvolunteer in that community.").
142The Court of Appeals held that a contract existed between KKI and the
appellants and that a special relationship could result from the relationship between
the researcher and the subjects. Id.at 843-44, 846. In addition, the Court of Appeals
held that duties arose under federal regulations and that such duties were consistent
with medical ethics. Id. at 846, 849-50.
143See discussion of Neade infra pp. 44-48.
1" Grimes, 782 A.2d at 851 (quoting I NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N,
ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS 3-4
(2000)) (internal quotations omitted).
145Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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steps to induce participation, discourage withdrawal, or even invest
the project with the imprimatur of a reputable health and research
institution. Additionally, the Grimes court's discussion of the
doctrine of substituted judgment suggests that it would entertain the
possibility of cure by means of a procedure involving independent
representation of the competing interests in appropriate legal or
administrative proceedings.146 But the emphatic language of Grimes
makes it difficult to see how a professional, acting as such and without a protocol satisfying minimal due process requirements, could
in
ever remove the shadow created where self-interest can 4be
7 alleged
nontherapeutic interactions with vulnerable populations. 1
To some extent, the Grimes court was concerned about the
adequacy of disclosures to the parents participating in the lead abatement research program; and to some extent the court was concerned
about break-downs in the implementation of IRB protocols intended
to oversee the research. But to an important degree, Grimes is a
statement to the effect that even if such protections had worked properly, they would not have been adequate: "Based on the record before
us, no degree of parental consent, and no degree of furnished information to the parents could make the experiment at issue here, ethically
or legally permissible. It was wrong in the first instance.' 48 Grimes
is perhaps an example of judicial paternalism in the ongoing struggle
within decisional law to find the boundary between professionalism
and the patient's right to self-determination. However one may feel
about paternalism, it should be acknowledged that the stance taken by
the court also had the effect of preserving a concept of professionalism as an institution in which certain forms of responsibility
ultimately and inescapably reside.
A more complete statement of the obligations of professionalism
with respect to conflicts of interest would require problems incurable
by mere disclosure. We fully encounter the parameters of professionalism, that is, only when we find responsibilities that cannot be transferred to the patient, but which the professional alone must retain, by
146

See 782 A.2d at 853-54. In its discussion of the doctrine of substituted

judgment, the Grimes court references Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1972) (describing an action by parents on behalf of a recipient twin against the
doctor and hospital that refused to transplant a kidney from a donor twin, then a
minor) and Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
141See 782 A.2d at 855 ("When it comes to children involved in nontherapeutic research, with the potential for health risks to the subject children in Maryland, we
will not defer to science to be the sole determinant of the ethicality or legality of such
experiments.").
148

Id. at 857-58.
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virtue of his or her status as such. The concept of professionalism
necessarily entails substituted judgment on a non-delegable basis.
Otherwise, we are left with a definition of the health care professional
as little more than an advisor to the patient, passing on the hard decisions. We encounter the limits of delegable responsibility in Grimes,
where the Maryland Court of Appeals held that "[a] researcher's duty
is not created by, or extinguished by, the consent of a research subject
or by IRB approval. The duty to a vulnerable research subject is
independent of consent, although the 149
obtaining of consent is one of
the duties a researcher must perform."'
2. Referral and Managed Care Legislation
From professionalism's point of view, federal anti-kickback and
self-referral legislation on the one hand and managed care enabling
legislation on the other proceed from irreconcilably opposite assumptions. The former seek to eradicate economic self-interest on the part
of physician while the latter seeks to stimulate and exploit it. The
Medicare and Medicaid anti-kickback statute ("AKS") 150 prohibits,
indeed criminalizes, any intentional solicitation or receipt of remuneration in return for a referral for goods or services reimbursable
under a federal health care program, and the companion federal selfreferral legislation ("Stark")' 5 ' prohibits any physician Medicare and
Medicaid referral for the provision of certain designated health services by persons or entities with which the referring physician has a
financial relationship, without any need to establish intentionality. So
much appears consistent with the core principles of professionalism,
which also require the physician to deal with his or her patient without
self-interest. The only conceptual difficulty with respect to professionalism is the problem noted above in the context of HIPAA,
namely that codification of this core value tends to encourage the professional to "play up to the line," as it were-go as far in the direction
of self-interest as is legally permissible-rather than act out of an
internal sense of responsibility to patients and colleagues.' 5 2 Codification tends to supplant the professional's sense of responsibility.

149

Id.at 850.

150 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2000).

...42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2000).
152 Shepherd, supra note 1, at 445.

For a discussion of the effect of the
complex array of fraud legislation on medical professionals, see Joan H. Krause,
Regulating, Guiding, and Enforcing Health Care Fraud,60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 241 (2004).
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Managed care enabling legislation, on the other hand, does not
seek to eradicate physician self-interest, but rather to cultivate and
channel it (or at least to enable this to happen). In one managed care
business model authorized by federal and state laws, a primary care
physician in a position to refer patients to specialists and hospitals
could receive remuneration for not doing so. The managed care plan
provided incentives for physicians to help reduce the cost of patient
care. From the viewpoint of the payor, whether Medicare or Medicaid
in the case of the AKS and Stark or a managed care plan in the case of
physician incentives not to refer, there is no contradiction: both
arrangements seek to reduce cost and discourage overutilization of
medical goods and services. Examined from the viewpoint of professionalism, however, the two statutory regimens appear ideologically
irreconcilable, because while the AKS and Stark align with the
professional mandate to avoid divided loyalty and self-interest, managed care laws sanction and even encourage self-interested conduct.
It is not surprising, then, that the legal concept of professionalism
encounters some of its most significant challenges in the context of
managed care litigation. 153
3. Managed Care
As the Supreme Court has acknowledged in Pegram v.
Herdrich,154 there would be no managed care without mechanisms
that rely on professional self-interest:
Like other risk bearing organizations, HMOs take steps to
control costs. These [cost-controlling] measures are commonly complemented by specific financial incentives to
physicians, rewarding them for decreasing utilization of
health-care services, and penalizing them for excessive
treatment.155
In legislating to authorize managed care, Congress and state legislatures removed from judicial discussion any question of mandating
professional disinterestedness in its purest form. Given legislation
stating that recognizing and manipulating professional self-interest is
...Mark A. Hall & Robert A. Berenson, The Ethics of Managed Care: A
Dose ofRealism, 28 CuMB. L. REv. 287, 288-89 (1998) (questioning the possibility of
sustaining medical ethics in a managed care environment: "We believe it is untenable
for the medical profession to continue asserting an idealistic ethic that is contradicted
so openly in daily practice.").
530 U.S. 211 (2000).

55Id. at 219.
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permissible in the context of controlling utilization of medical
services, courts have done little to shape public policy in this area.
Where they are confronted with questions as to whether HMO's
incentive plans corrupt medical judgment, the courts have for the most
part acceded to legislative supremacy and merely acknowledged that
pure professional disinterestedness is no longer public policy. 156 Perhaps as a result, courts have been slow in recent decades to develop a
57
body of common law concerning physician conflicts of interest.
Once it is allowed that professional conduct may be economically
coerced for purposes of allocating resources, the only questions
remaining tend to be policy questions, which courts are ill-equipped to
handle on their own: Should society risk harm to the individual in
order to reserve resources for others, or for the possibility of rendering
a greater good elsewhere? Does the economic harm of overutilization
outweigh the risk to an individual patient of underutilization in a
particular circumstance?
Since inducement to ration care goes to the very point of any
HMO scheme, and rationing necessarily raises some risks
while reducing others (ruptured appendixes are more likely;
unnecessary appendectomies are less so), any legal principle
purporting to draw a line between good and bad HMOs would
embody,5in
effect, a judgment about socially acceptable medi1 8
risk.
cal
And as between courts and legislatures, it is the latter to which the
power to determine socially acceptable levels of risk is allocated.
The situation with managed care is in a sense the opposite of that
we encountered in Humphers, where the court struggled to overcome
the confinement of traditional tort and contract law theories in an
effort to create a new, uniquely professional cause of action for
patients aggrieved by a professional's perceived breach of fiduciary
duty. The Humphers court needed legislation to act to help define the
duty, and this need was ultimately met with HIPAA. In the case of
managed care litigation in which patients seek to recover for breach of
a fiduciary duty, courts now find that legislatures have already spoken
on the subject with the clear intention of allowing the conflict upon
156 Bordlemay v. Keystone Health Plans, Inc., 2001 PA Super. 381; Pulvers v.
Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 160 Cal. Rptr. 392, 394 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). Incentive plans are authorized under Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, 42
U.S.C. § 300e (2000).
157 RODWIN, supra note 44, at 168.
...Pegram, 530 U.S. at 221.
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which patient-plaintiffs hope to build a claim. As a consequence, the
courts tend to collapse what might in other contexts be an independent
fiduciary claim into an existing tort or contract claim. Where plaintiffs bring claims against their physicians for failing to disclose the
conflict of interest inherent in their receipt of economic incentives to
delay or deny goods or services, courts have recently maintained that
the parallel tort malpractice claim is sufficient. The law of professionalism as such is contracting rather than expanding in the managed
care context.
Thus in Pegram, where the plaintiff alleged that economic incentives caused her physician to delay necessary testing, the Supreme
Court stated that a claim for breach of fiduciary duty for failure to
disclose could not exist in the same space as a claim for medical
negligence. 59 The plaintiff, complaining of groin pain, visited her
HMO-designated primary care physician, who required her to wait
eight days to receive an ultrasound at a facility over 50 miles away, by
which time the plaintiffs appendix had ruptured, causing peritonitis.
The plaintiff sued for both medical malpractice by the physician and
breach of fiduciary duty by the HMO. The Supreme Court reversed
the Seventh Circuit's holding that the plaintiff had stated a cause of
action for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, noting that the two
claims would overlap:
[T]he defense of any HMO would be that its physician did not
act out of financial interest but for good medical reasons, the
plausibility of which would require reference to standards of
reasonable and customary medical practice in like circumstances. That, of course, is the traditional standard of the
common law. Thus, for all practical purposes, every claim of
fiduciary breach by an HMO physician making a mixed decision [about a patient's eligibility for treatment under an HMO
and the appropriate treatment for the patient] would boil down
to a malpractice claim, and the fiduciary standard would be
standard traditionally applied in
nothing but the malpractice
160
actions against physicians.

159 Id. at 216, 235 (explaining that "for all practical purposes, every claim of

fiduciary breach by an HMO physician making a mixed decision would boil down to
a malpractice claim, and the fiduciary standard would be nothing but the malpractice
standard traditionally applied in actions against physicians").
160 Id. at 235 (citation omitted).
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Where the same standards establish the duty in question, and the same
harm establishes damages, allowing two claims appears
unnecessary.
The argument against duplicative causes of action is easiest to
make where the fiduciary claim is merely an effort to put a better face
on a weak malpractice claim, as in D.A.B. v. Brown.' 6 1 Here, a plaintiff class alleged breach of fiduciary duty against a physician for failure to disclose that his involvement in a kickback scheme in an
attempt to circumvent problems with the medical negligence claim
relating to statutes of limitations and the requirement of proving actual
injury. 62 But Pegram's progeny does not stop with such cases. Thus
in Neade v. Portes,163 the Illinois Supreme Court reviewed a suit
brought on behalf of a patient who died of myocardial infarction
against the treating physician. The plaintiff alleged both breach of
fiduciary duty and professional negligence on allegations that the
physician failed to disclose the incentives against referrals and medical tests on her husband created by their mutual managed care plan,
Chicago HMO. Mr. Neade had complained of chest pain and shortness of breath, in response to which Dr. Portes had hospitalized
Neade. While in the hospital, Neade received a thallium stress test
and an electrocardiogram, which a hospital-based physician interpreted as normal. When Neade continued to complain of chest pain
after discharge, on two separate occasions two different part-time
physicians in the Portes group recommended angiograms; but Portes,
relying on the hospital tests, declined to authorize the additional
procedures. Neade died of a massive heart attack approximately a
year after his initial hospitalization.
In an amicus brief, 164 the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association
("TLA") argued that an inherent conflict of interest was created when
Dr. Portes, acting on behalf of his medical group, negotiated a
contract with Chicago HMO in which a risk pool of $75,000 was
established for referrals and tests, with the stipulation that a portion of
any balance remaining at the end of each contract year would be
distributed to the physician group. In addition, the provider contract
was a capitation rather than a fee-for-service arrangement, creating
another incentive for the physicians in the provider group to underuti161D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
162 Id. at 171-72.
163 739 N.E.2d 496 (Ill. 2000).

164 Brief Amicus Curiae of the Illinois Trial Lawyers Ass'n in Support of
Plaintiff-Appellee, Theresa Neade, Administrator of the Estate of Anthony Robert
Neade, Deceased, Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496 (Ill. 2000) (No. 87445), 2000 WL
34213334.
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lize medical services. 165 Neither the plaintiffs nor the TLA argued
that the existence of incentives was per se a breach of fiduciary duty,
but rather that the inherent conflict of interest should have been
disclosed. Mrs. Neade urged in an affidavit that had she known of the
incentive arrangement, she would have sought a second opinion as to
the advisability of further tests.166 The defense prevailed, however, by
arguing that a claim of breach of fiduciary duty under these circumstances was duplicative of the underlying medical negligence claim,
not only because the two claims have the same damages, but also
because the fiduciary claim would have necessitated an exploration
into the physician's motives. 67 The court accordingly dismissed the
fiduciary claim, noting further that if there was a duty of disclosure, it
would not properly fall upon the doctor, for whom the burden of keeping track of the various incentives in the several managed care
arrangements existing
in his office at any given moment would be
68
unmanageable.'
The rationale for cases like Neade is not principally that plaintiffs
should not be permitted to circumvent procedural weaknesses in negligence actions, nor even simply that duplication of effort should be
avoided, but rather that there is something fundamentally deficient in
actions for breach of fiduciary duty based on conflict of interest, even
where recovery for negligence is unavailable. The gravamen of Mrs.
Neade's complaint was that had she known of the physician's
economic incentive not to test, she would have sought a second opinion, and the outcome would have been different. Indeed, two other
physicians had recommended angiograms, which would likely have
saved Mr. Neade's life. Dr. Portes' diagnosis of hiatal hernia and/or
esophagitis was wrong. The alleged breach of the fiduciary obligation
to disclose a conflict of interest constituted separate cause of action,
Neade maintained, distinct from the medical negligence, as it deprived
Mr. and Mrs. Neade of their opportunity to find a physician who
would have diagnosed correctly. Notwithstanding the misdiagnosis,
165 Id. As the Trial Lawyers acknowledged, these financial arrangements
could also be construed as incentives for the physicians to provide their patients with
preventive care rather than to underutilize.
166 Neade, 739 N.E.2d at 499.

167Reply Brief of Defendants-Appellants, Steven Portes, M.D. and Primary

Care Family Center, S.C. at 1-5, Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496 (Ill. 2000) (No.
87445), 2000 WL 34213331 at *1-5.
'68

Neade, 739 N.E.2d at 504 (citing Mark A. Hall, A Theory of Economic

Informed Consent, 31 GA. L. REV. 511, 525-26 (1997)). The court took judicial notice of the fact that doctors cannot be expected to keep up with the number and variety
of incentive arrangements to which they are subject. Id. So much for
incentives.

LAW OF DOCTORING

2009]

however, Dr. Portes was determined to have acted within the standard
of care in relying on the tests performed by the hospital-based physician and his diagnosis. He was therefore not liable in negligence, and
this determination, the court held, obviated the need for a separate
claim based on conflict of interest. The existence of the conflict was
irrelevant, since
the matter could be disposed of in a "medical negli' 169
gence claim.
If we were to extrapolate from Neade and cases of which it is representative to a policy governing professional conflicts of interest in
health care, it could contain the following precepts: Consent is only
required for health care treatment decisions, not for matters which,
however they may affect the provider's motives, are not directly related to the patient's health. There is no need for a separately actionable obligation of disinterestedness on the part of professionals, at
least where the patient has another action in tort or contract based on
standards of care; in fact, to give the patient the ability to attempt to
evaluate the professionals' competing motives of self-interest and
loyalty not only adds nothing, and arguably bestows a right impossible to exercise, but may also put the patient in a worse position than
she would be in had she left it to the professional to sort out priorities.
Imagine the patient, the reasoning goes, having learned that her physician has an economic motive to delay or deny treatment, attempting to
sort out for herself the relevancy of various factors: "Is my doctor
lying to me in order to benefit from the incentives created by my
HMO, or would any doctor give the same advice? Would another
doctor have other economic incentives? How strong are the incentives? Would my doctor yield to a relatively minor economic incentive if the health risk were major? If the risk were material, would my
doctor not suggest a second opinion himself? May I infer from my
169 Id. at

503. See also Sweede v. CIGNA Healthplan of Delaware, Inc., 1989

WL 12608 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 2, 1989). Here, Kelly Sweede sued both her health
plan and physician on allegations that the risk-sharing arrangement
prevented her physicians from providing appropriate medical care on a timely basis.
Id. at * 1. The court tried the cases separately, and in the case against the physicians
the court prohibited the plaintiff from introducing the financial incentive plan on the
grounds that it would not be relevant. Id. Compare the Sweede decision with the
dissent in Neade where the Chief Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court explained that:
"[t]here is nothing in the [HMO] Act, however, which suggests that an HMO's duty
of disclosure in any way supplants or supercedes the independent legal and ethical
duty which a physician has to divulge his financial interests in withholding care to a
patient. Indeed, to construe the Act as excusing physicians from their own disclosure
obligations would actually diminish patients' access to information and thereby undermine the very purpose of the law." Neade, 739 N.E.2d at 507 (Harrison, C.J.,
dissenting).
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doctor's conduct that a second opinion is not worth the cost to obtain?
Should I put myself in a position to weigh risks, or leave it to the doctor, with his superior medical knowledge? What damage to the
doctor-patient relationship will I cause by asking?" And so forth. A
policy based on Neade could rationally hold that the patient is in no
position to evaluate such risks, let alone the physician's motives, and
that giving the patient a right to do so would at best amount to granting an illusory benefit and at worst shifting a burden unfairly on one
ill-equipped to carry it. Under these circumstances the patient is
arguably best served by relying on the deterrents existing under tort
and contract law and allowing the physician to perform the relevant
balancing acts. But as for the fiduciary obligation itself, the policy we
have extrapolated from Pegram and Neade leaves it to the professional himself not only to arbitrate any conflicts internally, but also to
determine whether they should be disclosed. Such a policy may fairly
be characterized as paternalistic.
If Neade represents a reversion to paternalism, the alternative is
equally fraught. The dissent in Neade objects, in effect, that claims
for medical negligence and claims for breach of fiduciary duty based
on failure to inform the patient of conflicts of interest do not align so
perfectly as to permit one to be disregarded altogether. They are two
distinct causes of action, both of which have a role to play in shaping
professional conduct. On the facts in Neade, the doctor's conduct in
refusing to authorize an angiogram was within the standard of care,
but his separate conduct in concealing a motivating factor allegedly
prevented Neade from pursuing an alternative course of action that
would likely have saved his life. While it is easy to imagine circumstances in which this reasoning would prevail (as where the underlying conflict is not sanctioned by legislative acts authorizing managed
care inducements to professional restraint), it is also foreseeable that
there would be causation problems for plaintiffs. They must establish
that but for the physician's failure to disclose, (1) the patient would
have obtained a second opinion, (2) the second opinion would have
been different, notwithstanding the fact that the opinion given was
within standards of care, and (3) the patient would have obtained
further testing. In addition, to establish proximate cause, the plaintiff
would have to establish that he or she was not on notice of the conflict
of interest from sources other than the physician. A rule permitting a
plaintiff to state a cause of action if she can allege that she would have
asked for a second opinion had she known of the conflict, moreover,
could be discredited as an inducement to plaintiff fraud.
Both the paternalistic view of professionalism and that grounded
in patient autonomy leave something to be desired when it comes to
establishing standards for analyzing conflict issues. The paternalistic
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approach assumes the physician will decide properly, given the deterrence of remedies in tort or contract, and the approach based on
patient autonomy assumes the patient will make the right decision if
fully informed. The principal shortcoming of informed consent cases
for purposes of discovering neutral principles of decisional law relating to physicians' economic conflicts of interest is that such cases
begin their analysis at a point where the existence of the conflict has
already been acknowledged and deemed permissible, and where the
only issue remaining is disclosure. There is no occasion in such cases
for judicial consideration of whether the conflict should be permitted
in the first place, and no answer to questions such as how the professional is to weigh his interests in the balance with those of the patient.
We learn little of the substantive boundaries of professionalism where
we are merely told that an affirmative or negative answer to the question of disclosure is sufficient, after which either the physician or the
patient can decide the issue, but not how they should decide. What is
needed for present purposes, then, is a body of decisional law in
which the issue is whether the conflict is inherently so corruptive of
medical judgment that mere disclosure would not provide a sufficient
cure.
The principles we are given by the law of managed care with
which to shape a new concept of professionalism would seem generally to be inadequate for the purpose. To restate the situation with a
measure of cynicism, we are told by Pegram simply to accept the fact
that our healthcare professionals may be exposed to conflicts of interest, even self-interest, and we are told by cases such as Neade, first,
that the best we may expect in this situation is to be informed that we
may not be able to trust our doctors in a given situation, and secondly,
that the doctor may have no obligation so to inform us. At any
moment, we may need a second doctor (if possible one who is not
similarly conflicted); but even if we become aware of this need, there
is no legal standard by which we or our physicians may navigate
between the competing demands of patient loyalty and self-interest.
Pegram assures us that our physicians may not simply subordinate
patient loyalty to self-interest; but how the professional is to prioritize
competing objectives, and whether in the end he or she has properly
done so, are matters about which the law has little to offer. To be
sure, the patient continues to have his or her remedy in breach of contract or tort; but having fundamentally altered the traditional concept
of professionalism by admitting self-interest into the formula, it would
seem incumbent upon the law to do more to rescue the concept itself
from the resulting disorder.
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D. Self-Regulation
In a sense, all encounters between the law and the concept of
professionalism implicate professionalism's core value of selfregulation, and thus self-regulation has already been addressed in this
essay. Self-regulation is what professionalism needs to preserve its
integrity, and what law is willing to allow professions to the extent it
can before having to intervene on behalf of the public. Selfregulation, as mentioned above, is a cumulative attribute, justified by
the physician's disinterestedness, which is in turn required by the
patient's trust, itself necessitated by the complex body of knowledge
and the training and skill required to managed and implement medical
science. The scope of legislative tolerance for professional selfregulation is evident in the deferential standard established under various statutory regimes 170 for judicial review of determinations of
agencies such as medical hearing boards ,171 and again under the
provisions of the federal Peer Review Improvement Act 172 (the "Peer
Review Act"), authorizing government agencies to contract with
independent peer review organizations ("PROs")
comprised of medi73
cal professionals to review physician services. 1
One specific instance of deference to medical professionalism is
the rule, known as the exhaustion rule, providing that judicial review
of PRO determinations is not available until the physician has
exhausted all administrative procedures
and the PRO determination
74
thus becomes final and appealable. 1
170

See, e.g., Baldwin's Ohio Revised Code Annotated, establishing that in

order to overturn an agency order a reviewing court must establish that the order "is
not supported by any reliable, probative and substantial evidence in the entire record."
R.C. 119.12.
171 In re Williams, 573 N.E.2d 638 (Oh. 1991), at 639 (citing
R.C. 119.12,
supra note 170).
172 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c(l)-(13) (2005).
173 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-1(1)(A) (defining a PRO as an entity composed of or
having available "a substantial number of the licensed doctors of medicine and osteopathy engaged in the practice of medicine or surgery in the area and who are representative of the practicing physicians in the area ... ").
174 As explained by then First Circuit Judge Stephen Breyer in Doyle
v. Secretary of HHS, 848 F.2d 296 (1st Cir. 1988), the policy behind the exhaustion rule is
that it "allows the agency to develop a factual record, to apply its expertise to a problem, to exercise its discretion, and to correct its own mistakes, all before a court will
intervene. Insofar as specialized administrative understanding is important, the doctrine thereby promotes accurate results, not only at the agency level, but also by
allowing more informed judicial review. By limiting judicial interruption of agency
proceedings, the doctrine can encourage expeditious decision making. Insofar as
Congress has provided that an agency will decide a matter in the first instance, to
apply the doctrine normally furthers specific Congressional intent." Id. at 300.
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Applying this essay's methodology to the Peer Review Act and
regulations, the regulatory scheme appears to have identified the interests involved as (i) the professionals' interest in autonomy, (ii) the
public's interest in health and safety, and (iii) the payor interest in
economy and ease of administration. In the interest of the payor (in
the case of the Peer Review Act, Medicare), the Act strives for interstate uniformity of standards and procedures to facilitate administration. Disputes implicating professionalism have arisen where this
objective conflicts with the demand of the professional for deference,
as in Greene v. Bowen. 175 The remaining question is whether the regulatory scheme properly balances these interests, or does it
provoke courts to call for a second look. One area in which this question has arisen involves agency standard-setting, and in particular the
extent to which PROs should take local practices and circumstances
into account in assessing physician conduct.
Dr. Greene, a board-certified general surgeon practicing in sparsely-populated Tehama County, had been notified by California Medical
Review, Inc., a PRO, of its preliminary finding based on a random
search of medical records that Dr. Greene's performance had fallen
The violations
below standards on at least three occasions.
alleged generally involved failure personally to administer postoperative care and premature discharge of a patient from acute care to
a lower level of care. The applicable standard, established by regulation, required practice in accordance with "professionally recognized
standards of health care," and the PRO making the determination was
permitted, but not required by regulation to establish specific criteria
applicable to particular localities if "'(1) [t]he patterns of practice in
those locations and facilities are substantially different from patterns
in the remainder of the PRO area; and (2) [t]here is a reasonable basis
for the difference which makes the variation appropriate."", 176 Dr.
Greene objected that the standard unfairly ignored local practice standards.
In essence, he argues that given the geographic relationship of
Coming Hospital relative to his residence, and the fact that
there are only two board-certified general surgeons in Tehama
County, his practice of turning post-operative care over to the
referring physician (ordinarily a general practitioner) was well
175

Greene v. Bowen, 639 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Cal. 1986).

176

Greene, 639 F. Supp. at 562 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 466.100(c)-(d) (2007)).

The applicable regulation has subsequently been amended to require consideration of
the availability of other sources of services in the community. See 42 C.F.R. §
466.100(b)(3) (2007).
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within the standard of care in Tehama County. He notes,
however, that the PRO determination appears to have been
made by the application of the standard of care in San Francisco, a compact geographic community where there are, if
anything, a surfeit of physicians. 7 7
Supported only by precatory language of the regulation to the effect
that a PRO may take practice locale into account, the court insinuated
its way from the observations that the Peer Review Act "does not require a standard independent of local standards of practice,"', 78 and
that the "plaintiffs argument that a PRO must consider the standard of
care in a particular community is not without substance" 179 to the conclusion that "the statute and regulations may reasonably be read to
require a consideration of the standard of care relevant to the community in which the doctor practices."'' 80 Whether an interpretive tour
jet such as this was taken by regulators as a call for reconsideration
of the rule is uncertain, but subsequent to (if not in consequence of)
Greene and other similar cases,1 81 the rule was changed to mandate
PRO consideration of the "availability of alternative sources of services in the community" when assessing physician conduct.182 Claims
of cause and effect aside, cases such as Greene can be taken as judicial signaling for reconsideration of the original rule in the interest of
professional autonomy.
Regulations under the Peer Review Act as revised now require the
PRO to take the "availability of alternative sources of services in the
83
community" into account in assessing practitioner conduct.'
Considering that a primary objective of the Peer Review Act is to protect Medicare and its beneficiaries, it is perhaps understandable that
this item has not always been included in the regulations, and that its
presence or absence has from time to time been central to disputes
arising under the Peer Review Act. The issue is whether the PRO is
entitled to take into account facts such as the availability of qualified
alternative post-operative care when determining whether a surgeon
177

Greene, 639 F. Supp. at 560.

171Id. at 561.
179Id. at
180 Id. at

562.
561 (emphasis added).
181See, e.g., Lavapies v. Bowen, 687 F.Supp. 1193 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
182 The difference made by the regulatory change can be gauged with reference to Doyle, 848 F.2d 296 (1st Cir. 1988), sustaining application of the exhaustion
rule where the PRO regulations had been amended to include the requirement that the
availability of alternative sources of services in the community be taken into account.
Id. at 299.
183 42 C.F.R. § 1004.80 (2006).
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should have provided such care personally. Where more local
circumstance of this kind may be brought to bear upon a decision the
practitioner may be better served,18 4 but Medicare may not, as such
factors make it harder to attain uniformity of standards across the
country.
Legislatures may have the last word when public policy is to be
served, but courts should feel an obligation to assure that the last word
is not uttered until the claims of professionalism have been heard.
Self-regulation is not merely an expression of society's willingness to
tolerate professions in their place, but rather an attribute the absence
of which would be felt as a deep loss by professionals, patients and
society collectively. We understand self-regulation, and in a sense the
concept of professionalism itself, when we appreciate the extent to
which it exists because we need it, not merely because we tolerate it,
and that we need professionalism in a form not wholly comprehended
within legal structures.
V. CONCLUSION
The objective of this essay has been to help us recognize the
concept of medical professionalism when we encounter it in the law,
and then to react accordingly. I have suggested that at times the codification of medical professionalism is potentially a threat to it. A
taxonomy of the risks of codification with respect to medical professionalism would include the following: (i) Perhaps because they act
principally in response to majoritarian social demands and not always
with due consideration of core values of professionalism, legislators
and agencies are capable of supporting two contradictory theories of
professionalism at the same time. Thus licensure laws grant monopolies while antitrust laws prohibit them, and fraud and abuse laws
assume that physician self-interest is innately corrupt while managed
care laws seek to cultivate the same impulse. (ii) In other instances
the risk to medical professionalism results from the excessive reticulation of conduct by code, effectively transforming a culture of responsibility with a culture of rights. Witness HIPAA privacy rules and
fraud and abuse regulation under the AKS and Stark. (iii) In still other instances (the Williamson case discussed at the outset of this essay,
184 Lavapies, 687 F.Supp. at 1205 ("Plaintiff argues that the PRO panel included five physicians from Columbus, Ohio and one from Toledo, Ohio, all affiliated
with major urban hospitals. She further argues that her performance should have been
evaluated in terms of reasonable and appropriate care in rural Martins Ferry, Ohio and
that there is no indication in the PRS submittal to the OIG that she was so evaluated.").
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or managed care legislation, for example), legislation fails
adequately to separate professional and commercial motives, with the
result that the latter eventually drive professional conduct.
I have also suggested, however, that at times codification is the
instrument of necessary policy changes that would not otherwise
occur. It is true that legislators are susceptible to the influence of the
majoritarian will, but for this reason they are in many respects better
equipped to advance public policy than are courts, which are inherently bound to follow precedent and rule. Thus it is often legislatures
rather than courts that have driven the evolution of professionalism,
forcing it to accommodate a wider range of social interests. The
Humphers case discussed above, for instance, can be read as the
struggle of a court to formulate a concept of confidentiality that did
not exist in common law and for which legislation was needed. It has
been through statutory law, moreover, that our notion of professionalism has evolved to include recognition of third party interests, whether those be payors, quality regulators or the public at large. The evidence is not only managed care but also licensure and human
subject research legislation, among other statutory systems. It will be
critical to acknowledge the triadic nature of medical professionalism
as we begin to grapple with the idea of rationing medical goods and
services. However one may feel about the effects of certain statutory
regimes on the medical profession, few would now wish to construct a
legal system around the principle that the relationship between doctors
and patients is wholly and inviolably bilateral.
I have further suggested that decisional law has the capacity, and
arguably a duty to induce reconsideration of laws that potentially impair medical professionalism. The cases I have referenced demonstrate the importance of judicial review to the survival of the concept
of medical professionalism. At the same time, as in Humphers, I have
suggested that decisional law from time to time needs codification to
solve new problems. To a large extent, however, I have assumed the
importance of the idea of medical professionalism itself, or allowed
that fact to emerge on its own through the cases referenced. Why is it
important to preserve the concept of medical professionalism against
the risks presented by codification? I believe the reason is implicit in
the moments in which law confesses its inadequacy to the circumstances at hand. Such a moment occurred in Wickline v. State of
California,'85 which ended with a California Court of Appeal conceding that under applicable law the defendant physician had breached no
185 Wickline
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legal duty, but simultaneously urging that professionalism required
more.
Lois Wickline lost her leg due to medical complications occurring
after she was discharged from Van Nuys Community Hospital, four
days earlier than originally recommended by her surgeons and attending physician. These physicians had modified their original recommendation for a longer post-operative stay when the Medi-Cal payment authorization request was flagged by Medi-Cal's on-site nurse
and then rejected by Medi-Cal's surgeon consultant. 86 Medi-Cal's
professional representatives approved payment for only half the stay
requested by the treating physicians without discussing the patient's
condition with them, reviewing the medical records or examining the
patient. The treating physicians revised their discharge orders accordingly, at least one testifying that he believed Medi-Cal had the power
to compel the earlier discharge. All treating physicians were aware,
however, that they could have appealed for more time, yet all acquiesced to the earlier discharge. The medical expert witnesses in the
case subsequently testified that the conduct of the treating physicians,
including the earlier discharge, was within the standard of practice.
The treating physicians were not defendants in Lois Wickline's lawsuit, but had they been, they would not have been held liable for
professional negligence. The Court of Appeal was to make it evident
in its opinion, however, that this did not mean the treating physicians
had not breached a duty of professionalism.
The plaintiff in Wickline alleged that Medi-Cal's cost containment
program adversely affected her physician's judgment with the result
that she was prematurely discharged from and lost her leg due to medical complications as a consequence. 187 The court held that Medi-Cal
was not liable, in part because it had not led the treating physicians
negligently to depart from their standard of care, and in part because
Medi-Cal is California's Medicaid program.
Wickline was a case of first impression in California for the question as to
whether a prospective utilization review system could be causally linked to professional negligence. Medi-Cal's utilization review procedure constituted a departure
from traditional practice not only because it was conducted prospectively, but also
because it was not performed within the hospital setting and under the control of
treating physicians. Prospective utilization review, though more effective than retrospective review in controlling costs, risked interference with the attending physician's
professional judgment and thus not just the possibility of a wrongful withholding of
payment but of preventing medically necessary services. This was Lois Wickline's
fate. Id. at 1634.. See generally CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 70703 (2009) (noting that
medical staff by-laws, rules, and regulations shall include, inter alia, utilization review); JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS 197-98 ACCREDITATION
MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS (1985); 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(k); 42 C.F.R. § 405.1035.
186
187

HEAL TH MA4,
TR[X

384

[Vol. 19:317

the standard of care applicable to Medi-Cal was essentially the same
as that for the treating physicians,1 88 under which the earlier discharge
was permissible. As the same court later explained in Wilson v. Blue
Cross of So. California,8 9 "Wickline was not a case where a cost limitation program such as the Medi-Cal review process was 'permitted to
corrupt medical judgment. ... "' The Wickline court emphasized that
a patient "who requires treatment and who is harmed when care which
should have been provided is not provided should recover for the injuries suffered from all those responsible for the deprivation of such
care,
including,
when
appropriate,
health
care
payors."' 90 There could be no liability for negligence, either by the
professionals or the payor, where the standard of care had been met;
but that fact did not prevent the court from uttering the following dicta:
[T]he physician who complies without protest with the limitations imposed by a third party payor, when his medical judgment dictates otherwise, cannot avoid his ultimate responsibility for his patient's care. He cannot point to the health care
payor as the liability scapegoat when the consequences of his
own determinative medical decisions go sour. 19'
The court evidently felt obligated to sound this warning, even
though all the physicians involved had acted with applicable standards
of care, because at least one of the treating physicians had been
"intimidated" by the Medi-Cal program, and had mistakenly credited
it with authority to countermand his own professional determinations.1 92 The Wickline dicta resonated widely. The court's concern
was later codified in section 2056 of California's Business and Professions Code, which seeks to encourage treating physicians to advocate
for medically appropriate health care by protecting them against
retaliation by payors. 193 The Wickline court seems to have struck a
188

Wickline, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1646 (the court applied a standard of care

derived from its analysis of various statutes and regulations, including provisions of
former Welfare and Institutions Code § 14000 mandating the availability of Medi-Cal
resources "whenever possible and feasible.... to the extent practical ....
to secure
healthcare in the same manner employed by the public generally ... ").
189 Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 222 Cal. App. 3d 660, 666 (Cal. App. 2
Dist., 1990).
190 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1645.
'91
222 Cal. App. 3d at 666.
192 Wickline, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 1645.
193 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2056 (West 2003) provides in pertinent part as
follows: "(a) The purpose of this section is to provide protection against retaliation for
physicians who advocate for medically appropriate health care for their patients pur-
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chord as it speaks to a shared perception that professionalism is an
obligation above and beyond conformance with standards of care. It
is one thing to say Lois Wickline's physicians may not be held liable
for professional negligence as long as experts testify that the conduct
in question was within norms; but it is another to say that is how
professionals, as such, should conduct themselves. The court's
evident unwillingness to let legal liability be the last word on the
matter can fairly be read as an assertion that society, having
sanctioned the idea that a physician may respond to economic motivations, now more than ever needs professionals to assert moral authority, to act out of a sense of responsibility to safeguard quality of care.
It is in one sense admirable that the California legislature saw fit
to codify an incentive for professionals to advocate for their patients,
and it is a vindication of the thesis advanced by this essay. But in
another sense this action is problematic because it should not be necessary. Codification of the parameters of professionalism seems to
occur where both society and professionals themselves have lost faith
in the capacity of a profession to regulate itself. Perhaps the most
important lesson Wickline has to teach us is that professionals cannot
ultimately rest upon their legal rights, or shape their conduct solely by
the law, because ultimately the legal concept of professionalism does
not yield all of what we need from our professionals.

suant to Wickline v. State of California 192 Cal.App.3d 1630[;] (b) It is the public
policy of the State of California that a physician and surgeon be encouraged to advocate for medically appropriate health care for his or her patients. For purposes of this
section, 'to advocate for medically appropriate health care' means to appeal a payor's
decision to deny payment for a service pursuant to the reasonable grievance or appeal
procedure established by a medical group, independent practice association, preferred
provider organization, foundation, hospital medical staff and governing body, or
payer, or to protest a decision, policy, or practice that the physician, consistent with
that degree of learning and skill ordinarily possessed by reputable physicians practicing according to the applicable legal standard of care, reasonably believes impairs the
physician's ability to provide medically appropriate health care to his or her
patients[;] (c) The application and rendering by any person of a decision to terminate
an employment or other contractual relationship with or otherwise penalize, a physician and surgeon principally for advocating for medically appropriate health care
consistent with that degree of learning and skill ordinarily possessed by reputable
physicians practicing according to the applicable legal standard of care violates the
public policy of this state." See also Khajavi v. Feather River Anesthesia Med.
Group, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627, 632 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that "the plain
language of the statute demonstrates that it protects physicians and surgeons from
termination or penalty for advocating for medically appropriate health care.")
(citation omitted).

